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Abstract 
This report describes research that examined two innovative knowledge elicitation 
techniques to collect information about mobile mining equipment risks and to ultimately 
help identify potential controls. It focused on both experienced and inexperienced 
operators. The work was in three parts: 
Part 1. The use of the technique called ‘Critical Decision Method’ to analyse 
incidents involving mobile mining equipment- especially for experienced 
operators of such equipment. It was found that this technique was 
highly effective in uncovering how operators make sense of their 
working environments. By ‘getting inside the heads of operators’ it 
revealed important aspects that were not uncovered in previous incident 
investigations that used other techniques. 
Part 2. The development of a process for informal feedback, specifically verbal 
interactions, to be used to capture information about risks - especially 
for inexperienced operators during simulator training. The work 
focussed on informal feedback regarding mobile mining equipment use 
as part of a wider work system. As such, issues identified included 
communication drivers and barriers, equipment design risks, training 
deficiencies or limitations and types of verbal interactions. The 
interactions model shows potential as a process for facilitating improved 
training outcomes, such as operator decision making and situational 
awareness. It could also be used to identify training needs triggered by 
equipment reliability data and other operator issues. 
Part 3. Ongoing dissemination of the results from Parts 1 and 2 to the Minerals 
Industry via the EMESRTgate web portal (www.mirmgate.com/emesrt), 
to member companies of the Earth Moving Equipment Safety Round 
Table (EMESRT) and through teaching materials at the University of 
Queensland. Project outcomes are also being presented at relevant 
industry conferences and other forums, and will be published in 
recognised journals- examples of these are shown in the Appendix. 
Overall, the results of the research are a better user-centred understanding of 
equipment/operator related risks and where improvements could be implemented in 
incident investigation, communications, equipment design and training. In addition, the 
knowledge elicitation techniques developed and tested could be suitable for use in 
other coal mining situations, for example, in risk assessments. 
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Executive Summary 
Project Objectives 
The objective of this project was to examine two innovative knowledge elicitation 
techniques to collect operator-centred information about equipment design issues, 
training gaps, incident investigation gaps and communication risks. In more detail, the 
aims of this project were to: 
• Capture the verbal exchanges between experienced trainers and less experienced 
trainees during training delivered via simulation and other equipment training aids 
as a means of identifying issues that impact directly on normal truck operation; 
• Review this information feedback about operational tasks, in conjunction with data 
collected during simulator training, with a view to further understanding the 
operational risks involved in haul trucks and other mobile equipment; 
• Use the Critical Decision Method (CDM) to enhance knowledge about near misses 
and incidents through worker interviews and thereby uncover processes by which a 
critical incident is detected and causal factors are arrived at; 
• Compare the CDM results obtained to other incident investigation methods, thereby, 
validating the use of the CDM tool in the mining industry; 
• For both parts of the project, collect data in a naturalistic or simulation setting with a 
focus on critical events to further understand these events in the worksite context; 
• Improve identification and understanding of risks related to mobile equipment, and 
using this body of knowledge to further improve training techniques, incident 
investigations and equipment designs. 
 
Scope 
This project targeted the Improved Health and Safety Program category of the 2008 
ACARP call for Research Proposals, Open Cut Mining Priorities section, namely 
General improvement to the safety of mining and maintenance operations through 
novel procedural, operating, or equipment changes. 
The focus for data collection was limited to three key areas at each of the participating 
sites – the simulator training environment, mobile mining equipment operators and field 
trainers involved in pre-strip and mining production, and to a lesser extent, the 
maintenance sections, both workshop and field maintenance. 
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Main Findings and Conclusions 
The report is in two parts; the first part describes the Critical Decision Method research, 
and part two describes the Informal Feedback work.  For both parts, a review of 
literature is presented, the methods used are described, and then the obtained 
results/findings are presented. Also for each part, a discussion is presented and 
conclusions and recommendations are made. The main findings of each part are: 
 
Part 1: Critical Decision Method 
The Critical Decision Method (CDM) is a structured interview process that can be used 
to elicit knowledge from operators about their decision-making and problem-solving 
processes during critical incidents. The method involves the use of ‘probe’ questions to 
uncover the kinds of knowledge on which decisions are based, and the technique 
allows interviews to shift operators’ thinking from operational and general accounts of 
an incident into more descriptive retelling of how they solved problems, including using 
cues from their environment, during the critical incident. 
Following CDM’s successful use in other industries, it was anticipated that capturing 
and analysing information on mobile equipment related coal mining critical incidents 
and the decision making around these incidents will result in valuable information. The 
main findings of the research supported that, and showed that CDM is indeed a very 
useful tool to ‘get in the head’ and better understand the mindset of the personnel 
involved in incidents. The method is of increasing value with more complex incidents. 
The research also found that CDM uncovered important details not in current incident 
investigation reports - it is believed that such information could have a key benefit to 
help fully understand (and learn lessons from) the incident. As an example, one incident 
examined was a haul truck with its dump tray raised striking a reject bin chute. In this 
incident the CDM process found that a visual warning of the tray up was possibly 
obscured/made less conspicuous by sun glare, a potentially important factor that was 
not included in the previous incident report. 
 As such, further work with this technique (to integrate it into incident investigations and 
to use it proactively) is strongly recommended. 
Part 2: Informal Feedback 
Mining is a dynamic, people intensive industry where communication is predominantly 
verbal. The high level of interaction between people, equipment and the natural 
environment demands a heightened level of situational awareness to ensure good 
decision making to manage the hazards associated with these interactions. 
It was anticipated that experienced operators would be a valuable source of information 
to help improve trainee operator performance and decision making. Analysis of the data 
confirmed this expectation and also highlighted the potential to capture information 
about equipment design inadequacies that impacted on routine operation.  
Information about interaction types, nodes and communication flow was used to 
construct a model of workforce engagement based on the existing organisational 
framework and preferred methods of communication that could provide useful 
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knowledge for training about issues such as sensory cues and equipment design 
limitations.  
DECISION 
MAKING
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This type of knowledge could inform training strategies to  
• Refresh operator skills, regardless of experience 
• Improve situational awareness related to mobile equipment performance, 
equipment design issues, site hazards and procedures 
Improved human performance in these areas could reasonably be expected to lead to 
better decision making during critical events. 
The future step is to validate this model of workforce engagement by applying it for a 
specific purpose, such as improved understanding about risks associated with the 
introduction of proximity detection equipment and design of training to incorporate this 
knowledge. 
 
Industrial Applications 
The primary industrial applications are for individual mine sites, corporate level policy 
(eg incident investigation techniques and a framework for training needs identification 
that focuses on improving decision making and situational awareness), and through 
improved equipment design and training packages. In all applications, the emphasis is 
upon an operator-centred approach to training, routine operations and incident 
investigation. 
 
Outcomes and Benefits 
A raft of outcomes and benefits are being produced from this work which is specifically 
addressing the following ACARP Open Cut Mining Priorities:  
 General improvement to the safety of mining and maintenance operations 
through novel procedural, operating, or equipment changes (eg the successful 
CDM work for incident investigation) 
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 Development of training tools to transfer the benefits of improved techniques to 
operators (as evidence in the model created in the Informal Feedback 
component) 
 The development of practical methods to understand and reduce the negative 
impact of operational practices (again, the ultimate goal of both components of 
this project is to eventually develop practical tools to assess risks, improve 
training and learn better lessons from incidents) 
 
Specific outcomes: 
• Development of a communication/data collection process for capturing and 
analysing informal feedback about haul trucks and other mobile equipment 
operation and design issues.  
• Adoption of a human factors approach to improving performance 
o The proposed informal feedback model harnesses verbal interactions, the 
most common form of communication at mine sites, as the primary source of 
information for improving decision making skills through simulator training. 
This strategy represents a human factors approach to improving 
communication across three key areas of the business - training, operations 
& maintenance – by implementing a process that fits comfortably with the 
characteristics of the workforce.  
• Development of draft behavioural data collection processes for capturing and 
analysing narratives of critical incidents/decisions from mobile equipment operators. 
In particular, the Critical Decision Method revealed important aspects that were not 
uncovered in previous incident investigations that used different techniques. 
 
Industry wide outcomes: 
• The knowledge elicitation techniques developed and tested could be suitable for 
use in other mining sectors, so may be powerful additions to help capture risks 
associated with other types of equipment and general mining activities such as risk 
assessments. 
• It is also expected that adoption of the proposed verbal interactions model will 
necessitate improvement in the capacity of individuals to participate in meaningful 
consultation about mobile equipment and other risks, contributing ultimately to a 
mining OHS culture that is considered to be leading practice   
 
Benefits: 
• Ultimately, improved training techniques for simulator training, including coaching 
and mentoring skills, training materials development and an innovative approach to 
identifying training needs 
• Improved associated non-technical skills, such as communication and leadership, 
that drive consultation between management and workers      
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• Improved incident analysis techniques, which capture an operator-centred 
perspective better than current investigation methods. 
• Eventually, improved equipment designs and better integration of new equipment  
o CDM is generally applied to the investigation of actual incidents with existing 
equipment, so its primary use in the Asset Lifecycle is the operation and 
training stage, with the potential to lead to modifications or retrofits. In this 
manner the method could be used to determine how a design of mobile 
mining equipment might be modified to facilitate improved decision making. 
This may be through, for example, greater relevance of audible and visual 
information given by in-cab displays to haul truck operators or how to better 
reveal the information that maintainers used to diagnose equipment faults.  
o There is also the potential to use CDM at the concept stage and prototyping 
within the design stage. Designers may use the CDM process to engage 
experts in a forwards-looking CDM in a conjured situation to anticipate how 
design changes might affect their decisions. It could also be used to explore 
actual human performance on a prototype or simulator to predict how 
decisions will be made in the field. This is a promising new direction, but the 
research needed to achieve this is outside the scope of the current project. 
 
Technology Transfer 
To meet the main objectives of this work, the two streams of this research project have 
been disseminated in several ways to date. 
1. Mine site level 
a. A presentation about the informal feedback aim, objectives & work 
program was delivered to the training forum in November 2009 of the 
coal mining company supporting this research  
b. A future presentation outlining the findings of the project will be delivered 
to the training forum (in late 2010 or early 2011) of the coal mining 
company supporting this research  
2. Corporate level  
a. Presentations of the findings emerging and methods used have been 
given to corporate level representatives of the coal mining company 
supporting this research; the worth of the work was acknowledged by 
these professionals and it is hoped that further work in these areas might 
result (for example, in using CDM in future incident investigations) 
b. The research team will also seek opportunities to disseminate the 
findings to the Safety Sub Group of the ACARP Open Cut Committee. 
3. Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and simulator developers.  
a. Ongoing discussions with a leading simulator manufacturer about how to 
use the informal feedback findings. 
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b. Initial discussions from both parts of the project about ultimately passing 
onto OEMs the results that may be related to mobile mining equipment 
by linking project outcomes to EMESRTgate 
(www.mirmgate.com/emesrt). This is the online information 
dissemination tool managed by MISHC and used by the Earth Moving 
Equipment Safety Round Table (EMESRT) to provide information to 
OEMs about equipment risks. To date, the initial discussions have 
focused on the methods used in this project; should further ACARP-
funded research be conducted, then specific results would be 
disseminated via EMESRTgate. 
4. Initial publications have included (see Appendix 9 for further details) 
a. A presentation at a conference about operator-centred design of 
transport and industrial equipment (Horberry and Cooke, 2010). 
b. A poster displayed at the NSW Minerals Council OHS Conference 
(Leveritt, May 2010). 
c. Poster accepted for presentation at the Human Factors & Ergonomic 
Society’s Annual Conference in November 2010. 
d. A presentation accepted for the Queensland Mining Industry Safety & 
Health Conference in August 2010 (Leveritt, 2010). 
e. Poster accepted for presentation at the Human Factors & Ergonomic 
Society Europe Annual Conference in October 2010 (Horberry, 2010). 
f. A presentation at the Safety Institute of Australia’s Visions 2010 
Conference will be presented in October 2010 (Leveritt, 2010). 
In addition, in the longer term, it is the intention to disseminate the results of this work 
through other mining conference presentations, scientific journal papers and ongoing 
PhD research at the University of Queensland by one or more of the report authors.  
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Two recommendations for future work in this area are proposed, these are: 
1. To conduct further work with CDM in three areas: apply it to ‘repeat’ mobile 
equipment incidents, employ in an actual incident investigation (integrate, apply 
and evaluate it in an ICAM investigation) and trial the technique’s use as a 
proactive method, such as when introducing new controls or equipment (eg 
collision detection systems). 
2. Given the need for the mining industry to provide new starters with as much 
experience as possible, and for the existing workforce to maintain currency with 
new equipment technology and designs, it is strongly recommended that the 
proposed workforce engagement model be implemented as a protocol for 
improving operator performance through simulator training.  
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Part 1: The Critical Decision Method 
Review of literature 
The review of literature presented gives important background information about the 
Critical Decision Method (CDM) and how it has been successfully used in other work 
domains. 
 
What is the Critical Decision Method? 
The Critical Decision Method (CDM) is a structured interview process that can be used 
to elicit information and knowledge from experienced operators about their decision-
making, understanding and problem-solving processes during non-routine critical 
incidents (Crandall, Klein and Hoffman, 2006).  The method involves the use of ‘probe’ 
questions to uncover the kinds of knowledge on which decisions are based, and the 
technique allows interviews to shift operators’ thinking from operational and general 
accounts of an incident into more descriptive retelling of their problem solving 
processes during the critical incident. 
The Critical Decision Method builds on the earlier Critical Incident Technique that was 
first developed during World War II that was applied in a variety of situations through 
the study of near misses (Flanagan, 1954).  Going beyond the Critical Incident 
Technique in terms of a more structured and detailed method, the CDM is often found 
to be effective in revealing expert’s knowledge, especially tacit knowledge, reasoning, 
sense-making and decision strategies (Crandall, Klein and Hoffman, 2006).  Although it 
relies in part on memory, it has been argued that experts mostly have clear memories 
of salient or unusual safety-related incidents (Crandall, Klein and Hoffman, 2006).  
Previous work has examined CDM in other fields such as nuclear power, aviation and 
medical error, especially to identify perceptual and cognitive needs for aiding decision 
making, and to investigate incidents by reconstructing and understanding how 
operators made sense of the situation they were faced with (Hoffman, 2008). 
Coal Mining Incident Investigations and Operator Narratives 
Traditional incident investigation techniques deal mainly with the identification of a 
sequence of events hoping to identify unsafe acts or conditions: that is, what happened 
(Doytchev and Szwillus, 2009). Some go beyond looking at causal analysis to identify 
the relationship between incident events and the breakdown of any controls; how it 
happened (Simpson, Horberry and Joy, 2009).  However, it has been suggested that 
newer techniques are required to better understand what factors influence and 
predispose the decisions of mining equipment operators (Horberry, Burgess-Limerick 
and Steiner, 2010). Innovative investigation techniques are needed to help understand 
the incident, and decisions, from the perspective of the person making those decisions 
to give an appropriate representation of why the incident occurred. They would be 
particularly useful in real world situations where people made critical decisions that 
significantly contributed to the occurrence or prevention of an incident. The CDM is 
perhaps the most commonly used and researched method here. For example, Tichon 
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successfully used CDM to elicit knowledge from train drivers, finding significant 
numbers of environmental cues, actions to be taken and possible errors (Tichon, 2007). 
It assumes that people were attempting to make sense - sensemaking - of the 
information and situation at hand (Klein, 2008).  
Therefore, this part of the research reported here aims to understand the incident, and 
decisions, from the perspective of the person making those decisions: why it happened. 
Decisions in Complex Sociotechnical Systems are often made using tacit or inert 
knowledge; knowledge that persons have but never previously explicitly considered or 
expressed (Simpson et al, 2009). Therefore, simply asking operators what they were 
thinking at the time of an incident is unlikely to be enough. So, in complex situations, 
knowledge has to be specifically elicited from the persons involved.  
To the knowledge of the authors, no systematic investigation of CDM has been 
undertaken in coal mining. Perhaps the closest study to apply something similar in the 
minerals industry was performed by Dal Santo (2005). Her work investigated ground 
control (that is, rockfall prevention) decisions made by mining engineers working in 
underground mines. Two of her main findings were the importance of situation 
assessment (that is, the ability of mining engineers to be able to ‘read the ground’) and 
how the characteristics of decision making changed not only with experience, but also 
with motivation, expectation and specific hazard knowledge. The key focus of Dal 
Santo’s work was improving the design of ground control education and training; it 
appeared that CDM and related approaches could be of considerable benefit in 
understanding ground control decisions in mining, and developing better training based 
on this understanding. 
In sum, CDM is seemingly well suited to understanding incidents related to coal mining 
equipment from an operator-centred perspective, where the decisions of the operators 
in a complex work environment are often linked to causing, or preventing, accidents and 
incidents. 
Previous CDM work 
Aside from the Tichon (2007) work mentioned above that applied CDM to train driving in 
Australia, previous work has examined CDM in other fields such as nuclear power, 
aviation and medical error. In such work, CDM has been used for (Hoffman, 2008): 
• Identifying perceptual cues in various work situations and therefore how 
tasks, equipment and procedures can be redesigned to improve safety; 
• Identifying the level and nature of expertise required for different jobs; 
• Understanding decision making and identifying perceptual and cognitive 
needs for aiding decision making; and 
• Investigating incidents by reconstructing and understanding how operators 
made sense of the situation they were faced with. 
For example, the CDM technique has been used within the aviation industry to identify 
Expected Safety Behaviours and Markers (Simpson, Edkins and Owens, 2002) which 
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identify a list of expected safety behaviours which are then further used to enhance 
training programs, identify human factors issues and enhance crew resource 
management skills.  The information obtained about the cognitive aspects of critical 
incident situations has proved a valuable resource for future training, providing 
scenarios for organisation and site specific purposes in error management. 
The CDM has therefore proved successful in a variety of naturalistic environments and 
is recognised as a valid method of knowledge elicitation (Crandall, Klein and Hoffman, 
2006). Following CDM’s use in other occupations, it was envisaged that capturing and 
analysing information on mobile equipment related critical incidents and the decision 
making around these incidents would result valuable information emerging for the coal 
mining industry. The use of this technique within the mining industry may therefore 
enable the assessment of skilled operators’ perception and decision making during 
critical incidents involving mobile mining equipment. 
 
Scope of the Research 
The overall goal was to investigate if CDM could provide valuable information about the 
decision making of operators involved in mobile mining equipment incidents or near 
miss events. One particular aim was to establish if CDM revealed additional important 
information about operator decision making and sensemaking compared to current 
incident investigation methods. 
 
Method 
Procedure: CDM-Mining Process Description 
The research employed a ‘classic’ CDM method (as outlined by Crandall, Klein and 
Hoffman, 2006), adapted where required to the coal mining context (eg in the 
terminology used). The CDM interview process was undertaken by two researchers; 
one primarily an interviewer and one primarily a note-taker. The interviewee was expert 
in the work domain (ie an experienced mining equipment operator) but who had 
previously been involved in an incident. The interview took up to two hours, though 
significantly more time was needed for the preparation and analysis before and after the 
interview respectively. It took place in an office or other location that was suitably quiet 
and largely free of interruptions. 
The CDM process used in this research occurred in four stages (also known as 
‘sweeps’), with a series of structured probes to re-construct the incident. The multiple 
‘sweeps’ were made to progressively deepen understand the challenges faced and 
strategies employed by decision makers to cope with the situational, environmental and 
domain demands [Crandall et al, 2006]. The four stages used, know as sweeps, are 
described below and more details of them are given in Appendix 1. 
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Sweep 1: Incident Identification and Selection 
This stage focused on selecting an appropriate incident which would benefit from 
greater understanding. It was required that the interviewee must have been a decision 
maker or 'doer' in the incident.  
A review or screening of multiple incidents was often required in order to find one that 
was appropriate for the purpose of this research. The review was required to make sure 
that the interviewee was an active decision maker in the incident, and also that they 
were willing to discuss it (as the research was voluntary). Once an appropriate incident 
has been identified the interviewee was asked to give a brief account of the story from 
start to end. They often needed to be guided through the process and kept on track by 
not talking about other aspects that were not relevant to the purpose here. Notes were 
taken whilst the interviewee talked to provide the 'bones' for the subsequent Sweeps. 
Sweep 2: Timeline Construction and Verification 
This sweep of the incident aimed to gain a clear structure of the incident that was 
refined and verified with the interviewee. During this sweep the initial account of the 
incident was expanded. It began with a merge from Sweep 1 where an interviewer 
repeats what they have recorded with any additional comments or corrections by the 
interviewee. So the interviewee was encouraged to correct faults and add relevant 
information to ensure the account was consistent, accurate and appropriately detailed. 
The researchers then constructed a timeline of the incident in relevant chunks: distinct 
actions, occurrences or decisions. The timeline constructed was visible to the 
interviewee - using a whiteboard or large pieces of paper. Figure 1 shows one of the 
interviewers with a drawing of the incident location and a list of the order of events.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: CDM in process at a mine site 
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Following construction of the timeline, the critical junctures, or decision points, where 
decisions were made (and actions subsequently undertaken) were identified by the 
interviewers. This was done by examining the timeline and identifying exactly where the 
interviewee made such decisions- i.e. he/she was an active decision maker at that 
point. Following this, the CDM moved to the next Sweep. 
Sweep 3: Deepening Understanding 
In this Sweep, the researchers attempted to understand the interviewees’ sensemaking 
of the situation. It followed previous CDM researchers’ recommendations who stated 
that it needs to:  
“…get inside the experts head and see the world through his or her eyes... What 
is the story behind the story? Based on the first two steps (the researchers) 
know what happened... but what did (the interviewee) know, when did they know 
it, how did they know, and what did they do with what they knew?” (Crandall, 
Klein and Hoffman 2006, 78-79). 
To gain this information the researchers reviewed the critical junctures again, asking the 
interviewee a series of deepening probe questions. The probes used depended on the 
event but were generally aimed at determining the information available in the incident, 
the meaning of this information as interpreted by the interviewee and the thoughts and 
issues they provoked. At this stage the interviewee usually gave a rich understanding of 
the event, though occasionally, they may have been unable or unwilling to share their 
experiences (as the research used volunteer participants then they were more likely to 
be unwilling as compared to during an actual incident investigation; hence using CDM 
as part of a real investigation should mean that there would be far fewer unwilling 
participants as they are ‘compelled’ to be part of the investigation. Of course, where the 
mine site culture is proactive or generative then the unwillingness would be reduced 
even further). A regular pitfall was for participants to drift to generalisations and, whilst 
this might reflect their experience, skills and knowledge, it was important that the 
interviewee gave information on the selected incident.  
The CDM deepening probe questions, developed by Crandall, Klein and Hoffman 
(2006) from their previous experience of the technique were used; these are shown in 
Appendix 1 and the data collection sheets used are shown in Appendix 2. These probes 
were not a complete list of what could be asked, nor were they necessarily relevant in 
all situations, but rather they provided a starting point for the researchers to begin the 
deepening process. 
Sweep 4: "What if" Queries 
The last Sweep involved the interviewers posing a number of hypothetical changes to 
the event in the form of 'what if' questions. The participant was asked how their 
responses would have altered and/or if the outcome might have changed. This was to 
gain a deeper understanding of the experience, skills and knowledge of the interviewee. 
It was also useful in seeing if the information gained could be generalisable. The CDM 
"what if" probes, previously developed by Crandall, Klein and Hoffman [2006] from their 
experience of the technique, are listed in Appendix 1, together with the data collection 
sheet used (Appendix 2). Again, not all of these probes were necessary in all situations. 
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Data collected 
Before data collection, the research was approved by the University of Queensland’s 
Human Ethics Committee.  
Ten CDM interviews were successfully completed at site visits made to two open cut 
operations (surface coal mines) in Central Queensland. In addition to purely analyzing 
the data for the ten incidents, in approximately half of these events a formal local site 
incident investigation had previously taken place using the standardised Incident Cause 
Analysis Method (I-CAM).  I-CAM is a prevalent incident investigation method used in 
mining (De Landre and Gibb, 2006); it is based on James Reason’s models of 
organisational accident causation (Reason, 1997) and Jens Rasmussen’s 
skill/rule/knowledge model of human error (Rasmussen, 2005).  I-CAM provides a 
classification system for various local or latent factors that may be involved in an 
incident (De Landre and Gibb, 2006). The CDM results were compared to these 
existing incident reports, in particular examining where CDM added additional insights. 
To test the robustness of the CDM method, seven CDM interviews at an underground 
gold mine in Queensland were also completed; these focused on investigating the need 
for, and effectiveness of, a proximity detection system. 
Open Cut Coal Mines 
The following is a brief description the ten incidents studied at the two open cut coal 
mines. Interviews comprised eight specific incidents and two general categories of 
incidents. The interviews were conducted with operators of mobile mining equipment of 
various levels of experience, but mainly experienced operators now working primarily 
as trainers mainly due to them being more easily available (of course the method is 
applicable to be used with all operators). The specific incidents reviewed were: 
1. Uncontrolled Drop of Shovel Bucket Colliding with Reversing Haul Truck 
Interviewee was operating a shovel when the bucket of the shovel dropped 
suddenly whilst loaded. A haul truck was backing towards the shovel at that time 
and reversed into the shovel, though if the bucket had dropped slightly later it 
would have landed in the tray of the haul truck. 
2. Rollover of Bulldozer Whilst Pushing/Cleaning Overburden 
Interviewee was operating a Bulldozer, whilst being supervised by another 
operator in a nearby bulldozer, to clean overburden when the shovel had 
recently been. When reversing backwards the interviewee veered slightly to the 
left into the lower cut made by the other dozer resulting in the interviewee's 
dozer rolling onto its roof. 
3. Fire at a Fuelling Station 
Operator was an apprentice offsider to a fuel truck driver who connected the fuel 
hoses to fuelling stations that usually automatically stop when being full. 
However, on this occasion the fuel started to spray out of the top of the fuelling 
station landing on the turbo engine of the fuel truck, eventually starting a fire that 
destroyed the fuel station and the truck. 
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4. Drove Haul Truck with Dump Tray Up striking Reject Bin Chute 
Interviewee was the operator of a haul truck that was not limiting gear and 
speed of haul truck when tray is up. After parking up near reject bin, maintainer 
attempted to fix the problem. On test run to see if the problem was corrected the 
tray did not descend and struck the reject bin chute causing damage to the truck 
and chute. 
5. Rollover of Troop Carrier 
A rollover of a troop carrier occurred when descending a haul road at the mine 
where the interviewee was the operator. 
6. Collision between Bulldozer and Grader 
A collision when a bulldozer cleaning the face near a digger reversed into a 
stationary grader. The grader, driven by the interviewee was parked behind haul 
trucks waiting to be loaded by the digger. The nature of the situation was that 
though the bulldozer reversed into the grader the interviewee made critical 
decisions. 
7. Engine Fire in Digger 
An engine fire of when the interviewee was operating a Leibher 994 digger with 
the potential for serious injury. 
8. Loss of control of Haul Truck Down Ramp 
The interviewee was operating a haul truck and, not long after it had begun 
raining, spun out of control whilst exiting the dump site and descending a 
cornered haul road ramp spinning over 180 degrees and striking a bund wall. 
The two general types of decisions incidents reviewed were: 
9. Decision Making of Maintenance when Haul Truck Engine shows Low Horse 
Power 
This CDM interview was conducted with a haul truck maintenance supervisor. 
The supervisor was unable to recall any specific incidents related to haul truck 
maintenance. Therefore, a CDM was conducted on the common and complex 
decision making task when a haul truck engine shows low power. Decisions 
were interestingly made with competing demands between operation and 
maintenance and trial and error process starting with the most cost-effective 
option that has often remedied this type of problem in the past. 
10. Missing Alignment when Reversing Haul Truck into Shovel. 
The interviewee in this case was a contract haul truck driver. Again the 
interviewee was unable to discuss a particular incident (again, it is stressed that 
they were volunteers in this research, so not compelled to take part here). 
However, they noted that one of the most difficult task was reversing the haul 
trucks into the shovel. The usual strategies and decisions related to this task 
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were analysed that could be used to consider general incident causation and 
prevention when reversing haul trucks. 
 
Application of CDM to another area of mining  
Additional, seven CDM interviews were also conducted at an underground gold mine, 
relating to the use of a proximity detection system. 
Knowledge and experiences were elicited from operators involved in previous mobile 
equipment collisions or who used the current proximity detection system. This allowed a 
detailed user-centred perspective of equipment operation tasks and the current controls 
in place. Initially, it was planned to directly use the CDM to elicit knowledge about 
vehicle incidents and near misses, on the basis that these represented ‘tough cases’ 
which has previously been found to be an efficient way of eliciting knowledge from 
experts. However, the interviewees were unable to recall real incidents to analyse 
(partly because of the newness of the system, in which no incidents had been formally 
reported at that time). 
Instead, a modified CDM was used where the operators were asked to consider where 
they felt the more complex areas of road and vehicle interaction were in a mine and 
construct a fictional, but possible, scenario of a collision occurring.  This included the 
position of the vehicles in the mine and the other barriers that would need to fail in order 
for proximity detection to be useful.  Though not real scenarios, it did show a logical 
path to failure, and helped determine what features a proximity detection would need for 
it to be effective.  These features could then be compared to the current RFID (Radio 
Frequency Identification) proximity detection system in place.  Seven operators were 
interviewed by two experimenters. In every interview the operator was able to construct 
plausible, though admittedly unlikely, scenarios where a collision could occur and a 
proximity detection system could be useful should other controls fail.  This included 
scenarios in the underground, on surface haul roads and around workshop areas.  
 
Results  
Coal Mining Incident Results 
The main findings obtained for the 10 incidents examined at the open cut coal mines 
are shown in Table 1 below1.  
 
1 Regarding the I-CAM comparison aspect, it should be noted that it is unknown how rigorous 
these previous I-CAMs were. Future research is planned to use an expert to do an ICAM and a 
CDM to see what additional information is collected by the CDM. 
 
Also, it should be noted that the CDM findings below have only one interviewee, therefore were 
potentially one sided. Further CDM research should interview all the people involved (supported 
by documents/technical experts as required) to help further validate the process. 
Table 1: CDM findings for the ten coal mining incidents 
# Incident description Main Incident Notes from CDM Main CDM Findings and Key Decisions 
Compared to
I-CAM 
Additional findings compared with 
I-CAM 
 
1 
 
Uncontrolled 
drop of shovel 
bucket, so 
colliding with a 
reversing haul 
truck. 
 
 
• Interviewee was operating a shovel and loading haul trucks 
when there was an uncontrolled drop of the bucket. 
• At the time a haul truck was backing under the shovel.  The 
bucket dropped just before the haul truck was under the 
shovel but it could not stop before reversing into it.   
• Had the drop happened later it could have fallen into the tray 
of the haul truck. 
 
 
• There is a tendency for the bucket to ‘drift’ downwards 
if not actively pulled back.  This might have caused the 
operator to pull back on the leaver when the bucket fell, 
rather than pressing the emergency stop button. 
• Operator noted that a fault error displayed on the 
screen that he had not previously seen, and was not in 
the instruction manual. 
YES 
 
• The I-CAM report does not note how 
the driver attempted to halt the bucket. 
• Error message that the driver claims to 
have seen is not noted. 
• It also has only a very short description 
of the incident and one word answers to 
I-CAM questions, which would make it 
difficult to ascertain a pattern should a 
similar event reoccur. 
 
 
2 
 
 
Rollover of 
bulldozer whilst 
pushing/cleanin
g overburden 
(top soil) 
 
 
• Interviewee was a trainee bulldozer driver pushing back 
overburden alongside a trainer operator. 
• The trainer was working on the overburden in another 
bulldozer and paying only little attention to the trainee. 
• At the point of the rollover he was working in a ‘cut’ directly 
next to the trainee and creating a lower level. 
• Trainee was attempting to reverse straight back, but was 
actually going at an inaccurate angle and the vehicle fell into 
the trainer’s ‘cut’. 
 
 
• The lack of awareness by the trainee that he was not 
reversing in a straight line was a key cause of this 
incident. 
• Factors increasing the likelihood of this error included 
the limited rear vision, the lack of light (night shift) and 
perceived pressure to keep up with the trainer’s pace. 
• The trainer’s lack of intervention (eg by radio 
communication) in this was also a key cause. 
• Additionally, having another bulldozer working in close 
proximity created the conditions (ie the ‘cut’) where the 
bulldozer could roll. 
 
YES  
 
• The supervision of the trainee was the 
key factor noted in the I-CAM and the 
practice of having a trainer work next to 
a trainee was ceased. 
• Key factors relating to the error 
reversing appear to have been 
overlooked or not identified, such as the 
low lighting, perceived time pressure 
and lack of vision out of the cab. 
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# Incident description Main Incident Notes from CDM 
Compared to Additional findings compared with Main CDM Findings and Key Decisions I-CAM I-CAM 
 
3 
 
 
Fire at a 
fuelling station 
 
• The fire occurred at the fuelling station when the interviewee 
was working as an offsider (helper) to a fuelling serviceman. 
• Sometime after connecting a ‘wiggins fitting’, which 
automatically fills the fuel station using the engine of the 
pump, both participants noticed that fuel was spraying out of 
the top of the fuel station. 
• This fuel landed on the top of the turbo of the refuelling truck 
and caught fire immediately, at which point both the 
serviceman and the interviewee fled the area and a large fire 
ensued. 
 
 
• The serviceman attempted to cancel pumping using 
the control system, indicating that an emergency stop 
was not fitted or available. This may have been 
exacerbated by the fuel auto shut off not working in the 
first place and therefore possibly leading to operator 
inattention due to their expectation that it will shut off 
(ie over-reliance on a system /process) 
• Vehicle movement was isolated using the park break.  
In another case this might have prevented the vehicle 
being moved which would have stopped the fuel hitting 
the fire. 
• There was no protection/barrier between the hot 
engine and the fuel exiting. 
YES 
 
• The I-CAM noted a corrective action 
was fit a ‘deflector’ on the fuel tank to 
assist in preventing fuel heading in the 
direction of the pumping vehicle.  
Additionally, a cover was placed over 
the engines. 
• The difficulty in cancelling the fuel flow, 
and the emergency stop, was not 
noted. 
• The potential issue of unengaging park 
brake isolation in an emergency was 
not addressed. 
 
 
4 
 
 
Drove Haul 
Truck with 
Dump Tray Up 
and Striking the 
Reject Bins 
 
 
• Whilst working as a haul truck driver the interviewee noticed 
that after dumping a load and driving away from an area 
whilst the tray descended the truck was able to shift up to 
second gear and pass 8km/h without an alarm sounding.   
• Shifting up gears should be prevented automatically and an 
alarm set off if the truck passes 8km/h without the tray fully 
descended. 
• The driver called maintenance to notify them of the issue.  
After some time they notified him that an electrician was 
available and to park the truck up. 
• The driver did this on his way collect a load from the reject 
bin; an overhead chute which transfers waste from the 
process plant into the truck. 
• The electrician worked on the issue, thought it was solved, 
and sat in dicky (spare) seat to catch a ride to the 
maintenance shed. 
• Driver forgets to pull leaver to take tray down, the alarm does 
not sound and the upright tray strikes the reject bin. 
 
 
• The reject bin is surrounded by ‘idiot balls’:  large balls 
on wire that would normally be contacted before 
entering the area of the reject bin if a tray is in the 
upright position.  However, the park up bay that the 
driver selected was past these idiot balls. 
• The electrician felt he had fixed the issue of the lack of 
tray alarm, but this was not tested or the test was 
accidently missed. 
• Other than the tray alarm, there may have been a 
display showing the driver that the tray was in the 
upright position.   
• The alarm may actually have been working but the 
truck not at 8km/h before striking the reject bin. 
• The driver and the electrician knew each other and 
were friendly.  They may have been distracted whilst 
chatting, so not noticing the tray. 
YES 
 
• The I-CAMs corrective actions were re-
enforce the need for walk around 
inspections, the installation of sacrificial 
devices close to the reject bin to 
prevent collisions. 
• The I-CAM did not note that the 
roadway was designed such that a 
park-up bay was past the ‘idiot balls’. 
• I-CAM did not investigate how the 
driver may have missed pulling the 
leaver to flatten the tray.  However, the 
CDM found it was probably because he 
usually does not pull the leaver at start-
up and preformed his usual start-up 
movements whilst talking to the 
electrician.  This could probably be 
prevented by having an audible tray up 
alarm on startup. 
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# Incident description Main Incident Notes from CDM 
Compared to Additional findings compared with Main CDM Findings and Key Decisions I-CAM I-CAM 
 
5 
 
 
Rollover of 
troop-carrier 
 
• Rollover occurred on a 10% grade ramp.  Just prior to the 
rollover a water truck had watered one side of the ramp. 
• Driver was moving off the ‘rough’ road and skidded when 
one side of the vehicle hit wet but hard and slippery clay. 
• Vehicle had 4-wheel-drive but was engaged in 2 wheel drive 
at that time. 
 
• The watering of the ramp was an important primary 
causal factor. 
• Subsequently, the judgement of the road conditions 
and speed was an important causal factor in the 
rollover. 
• This was, potentially, made more likely by the type of 
vehicle and non-engagement of 4WD. 
Results of I-
CAM reported 
by interviewee, 
but not 
confirmed in 
writing. 
 
• Main result of the I-CAM was to re-write 
watering policy on ramps, changing 
from continuous to spot watering. 
• Input of troop carrier factors appears 
overlooked: such as speed, driver 
judgement and the engaging 4WD. 
 
6 
 
Collision 
between 
bulldozer and 
grader 
 
 
• A grader, driven by the interviewee, was parked in a line of 
trucks waiting for a shovel load, meaning that the grader 
could not move significantly. 
• The bulldozer that was cleaning up the face where the shovel 
had been backed to within 10-20m of the grader.  At this time 
the grader operator radioed the bulldozer operator and at the 
same time the bulldozer moved forwards. 
• The bulldozer involved had limited rear vision and significant 
noise, which can mask radio calls. 
 
 
• The grader operator perceived that the bulldozer 
operator had heard him because of the timing of 
change in direction.  But this turned out to be a 
coincidence. 
• The lack of vision and significant noise, in the bulldozer 
was a significant cause of the collision. 
• The design of roadways and vehicle separation may 
have also played a role. 
 
Results of 
Investigation 
reported by 
interviewee, but 
not confirmed 
in writing. 
 
 
 
• The interviewee noted that the 
investigation attributed the cause of the 
accident to be primarily due to lack of 
confirmation that a radio call had been 
heard. 
• The CDM investigation found that the 
incident was much more complex, and 
continued radio calls by the interviewee 
was unlikely to have prevented the 
collision. 
 
7 
 
Engine Fire in 
Digger 
 
• Machine was an older model with existing issues. 
• Operators stated that the engine was ‘surging’ during driver 
‘hot seat’ change.   
• At this stage, a general/informal inspection was conducted 
for ‘something out of the ordinary’. 
• However, a driver would not necessarily know the specific 
cause for surging- it is up to the judgement of the operator to 
notify maintenance. 
• Operator continued to operate the equipment after the fire 
began, as it was at the rear of the machine and not visible to 
the driver.  He was notified of smoke by a haul truck driver. 
• In this case he manually pressed the fire-suppression.  
Usually operators would not press the fire suppression 
unless they saw flames, as it was known to be costly.  Newer 
equipment automatically sets off fire suppression on 
smoke/fire detection. 
 
 
• Driver of equipment must informally check 
equipment in the field, making judgements on the 
seriousness of issues.  This is solely based on their 
experience and instinct. 
• The communication between equipment operators 
can be key to identifying if smoke is abnormal and 
the presence of fires in their early stage. 
• The high financial cost of falsely pressing the fire 
suppression system does influence the operator’s 
decision to engage the system. 
No.  
No I-CAM 
available 
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# Incident description Main Incident Notes from CDM 
Compared to Additional findings compared with Main CDM Findings and Key Decisions I-CAM I-CAM 
 
8 
 
 
Loss of control 
of haul truck 
down a ramp 
 
 
• The loss of control took place on a wet ramp in rainy 
conditions.  The operators had been discussing the 
conditions, and whether they warranted ‘parking up’. 
• Loss of control took place when vehicle was unloaded it 
descending the ramp on approximately the 30th run of the 
day. 
• Usually a slip is more likely when descending unloaded, and 
whilst a driver may notice some issues when ascending 
loaded they are generally committed to an entire run once 
loaded. 
• The road was ‘cambered, seemingly encouraging higher 
speeds to the interviewee driving the truck. 
. 
• The judgement of when rain causes the roads to 
become dangerous is a key decision made by the 
team.  This decision is not black and white and would 
have external influences, such as production 
pressure/competition. 
• The misjudgement of safe speed, set by the auto-
retarder, down a ramp was a key cause of the accident 
worthy of further investigation. 
• The roadway design, with a ramp that included a 
banked corner, could have also been a cause of the 
accident. 
 
No. 
Investigation 
was not 
conducted. 
Incident prior 
to site I-CAM 
use. 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
Decision 
Making of 
Maintenance 
when Haul 
Truck Engine 
shows Low 
Horse Power 
 
 
• This interview regarding how a maintenance manager would 
typically address the issue of ‘low horse power’ on a haul 
truck. 
• The interview revealed that the maintenance checks followed 
more of a ‘trial and error’ pattern than absolute diagnosis of 
the problem. 
• As maintenance managers have their KPI as ‘availability’, this 
tends to mean that more cost effective options that have fixed 
the problem in the past are tested first. 
 
• Generally the driver would be told to continue using the 
truck until a mobile ‘breakdown’ unit can attend. In this 
case the mobile breakdown unit usually checks for 
blow/leaking hoses.   
• If this is not found the oil and air filters are replaced, 
even if no obvious issues are noted, as this is cost 
effective.  Occasionally, air filters and oil filters have 
been changed multiple times by alternate shifts due to 
poor communications. 
• It is then left to the operator to note if the problem has 
been ‘fixed’ or ‘not fixed’; which is not a totally objective 
judgement and operators have been known to have 
different opinions. 
• Only when these field options have failed is the truck 
brought in for maintenance where more cost effective 
options are trialled (eg replace injectors) before more 
expensive options (eg turbo). 
• Hierarchical expenditure approval caps reinforced this 
situation.  For example, fitters can approve up to 
$2,000 of expenditure, but need to go to their 
supervisor for higher expenditure who is, in turn, must 
go higher for approval of expenditure over $4,000. 
 
No. 
Not a specific 
incident. 
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# Incident description Main Incident Notes from CDM Main CDM Findings and Key Decisions 
Compared to
I-CAM 
Additional findings compared with 
I-CAM 
 
10 
 
 
Missing 
Alignment 
when 
Reversing Haul 
Truck to Shovel 
for loading 
 
 
• This interview regarding the general issues with alignment of 
the haul truck when backing into a shovel. 
• The interviewee (a driver) was asked to describe in detail how 
this task is typically achieved. 
• For the future, this type of information could be checked 
against training manuals to see if taught practices are actually  
used or are simply a hindrance to the process 
 
• Finally, for future research, both cases 9 & 10 could be useful 
if done in a group- especially where CDM is being used as a 
proactive risk management tool. 
 
 
• The driver used a number of ‘tricks’ and cues when 
reversing.  This included using just the left mirror, past 
tracks of haul trucks, horn or radio from the shovel 
operator to correct positioning. 
• If the first truck to reverse to a particular position of the 
shovel lines up poorly there is a tendency for future 
drivers to use their tracks as a guide and repeat the 
mistake. 
• The reversing camera is not very useful in lining up 
correctly but may help the driver pick up any rocks 
dropped by previous drivers. 
• The glare from the sun in the side mirror, causing the 
driver to lose vision of the shovel for a short time, was 
thought to be the most common cause of lining up 
incorrectly. 
No. 
Not a specific 
incident 
 
 To illustrate more findings from the process, one of the incidents (#4 ‘Drove Haul Truck with 
Dump Tray Up striking Reject Bin Chute’) is used as the example. A flowchart of the incident is 
show in Figure 2 below. This shows the major stages of the event (in text boxes and the key 
decision points (as rectangles- after boxes 3, 6, 11 and 13). 
 
Figure 2: Flowchart of one incident 
For these key decision points, the decisions made were further explored. In terms of the content 
of this examination, examples of what the deepening probes found in Sweep 3 (but not noted in 
the I-CAM incident investigation) included: 
• The driver had rarely previously started the truck with the tray up. 
• “Idiot Balls” were placed around the mine, but the park up bay was past the last idiot ball  
• The display for tray up was only visual. 
• The display was possibly obscured/made less conspicuous by sun glare 
• The driver was talking to the electrician during the drive. 
• No visual feedback on tray from the driver’s position 
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 Similarly, example findings from the “What if” inquiries (Sweep 4) that were not noted in the 
previous I-CAM investigation report were: 
• An audible signal might have alerted the driver to the fact the tray was up. 
• If the driver was not friendly with the electrician he may have noticed the tray (due to him 
being partially distracted by their conversation). 
• If the park up bay was further from the reject bin or the road conditions were better, the 
driver would have reached 8km/h and set off the tray up alarm. 
 
The use of the CDM technique in the analysis of mobile equipment incidents has therefore 
shown that the knowledge elicited from the operators involved in these events provided valuable 
‘extra’ information compared to the incident analysis methods currently in use (eg I-CAM).  
Therefore, by focusing on the key decision points for operators, and unpicking the cues, 
information, goals, prior experience and related probes the research was able to obtain a much 
deeper description of the incident event than the standard narratives used in much of the 
minerals industry today. However, these conclusions are still only tentative - data have not been 
validated (eg compared to objective recordings such as photos taken at the incident) and are 
based on one interviewee only per incident at this stage. 
For example, the current technique used for the investigation of an incident involving a road 
grader and a bulldozer found that breaching procedures and not establishing radio contact 
between operators was the primary ‘cause’ of the accident.  Therefore, a reminder to operators 
to follow procedures about radio contact was the sole action taken to prevent a repeat collision. 
However, the CDM methodology used identified that the background noise of the bulldozer and 
the hearing protection worn by the operator meant that it was likely that the operator could not 
hear the supplied radio and positive radio contact could not be established in this situation if 
repeated (however, more generally, it must be stressed that it is important for the dozer operator 
to have positive radio contact in high use areas especially if reversing - so if he/she cannot hear 
he/she should not operate). 
 
Critical Decision Method at a Gold Mine  
As noted previously, as this site had no previous incidents involving collision detection systems, 
a modified version of CDM was used that focused on scenarios. The separate interviews were 
successful in determining scenarios where proximity detection, if effective, may prevent 
collisions.   
Each scenario was represented using Energy Trace and Barrier Analysis (ETBA) (a risk 
assessment procedure to detect hazards by focusing in detail on the presence of energy in a 
system and the barriers for controlling that energy) to qualitatively show how the scenario might 
develop.   
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 In all scenarios, additional controls that assist operator knowledge of the location of other 
vehicles were required to fail for a collision incident to possibly occur. These additional controls 
include: 
• radio communication (where drivers are required to regularly ‘call’ their position and 
direction), and 
• visual location of the vehicle (either directly or through a reverse angle camera mounted 
in the cab).   
Figure 3 below an example of where a proximity detection system may act as a control should 
these other controls fail. 
 
1 2 3 4 
Truck 1 has reversed 
into a stockpile and 
dumped a load of 
waste and waiting 
until the roadway is 
clear to descend the 
mine. 
Truck 2 is ascending 
the mine’s main drive 
with a full load of ore 
and a light vehicle 
(LV) following. 
Radio communication 
has failed and Truck 1 
is not aware that the 
light vehicle is 
following Truck 2. 
 
Truck 1 exits the 
stockpile after Truck 2 
has passed 
 
Figure 3: Example scenario where proximity detection system may act as the key control. 
In this scenario, there would be potential for Truck 1 to hit Truck 2 if radio 
communications were the only barrier, however the second barrier of direct visual 
location of another vehicle may prevent truck 1 from hitting truck 2, but it may still hit the 
light vehicle (which would be largely obscured to Truck 1 because the light vehicle was 
closely following Truck 2). 
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 CDM Discussion 
The CDM method was adapted to the mining context and was successfully applied to incidents 
in both open cut coal mining and an additional area (underground gold mining). Five key 
discussion points emerge from these results. 
1. Mobile Mining Equipment Incidents are regularly complex 
The CDM revealed many of the incidents related to mining equipment to be complex in nature 
involving the alignment of a number of events allowing the failure of numerous barriers of 
defence, commonly triggered by local atypical conditions.  This aligns well with the James 
Reason model of the dynamics of organisational accident causation (Reason, 1990 & 1997) and 
supports the view that CDM could be a valuable tool to add to complex incident investigation (ie 
higher risk events only).  For example, in the above-reported incident where a bulldozer struck a 
grader, the immediate causes of unsafe acts involved the parking of the grader and loss of 
situational awareness by the bulldozer operator.  However, upstream the local workplace factor 
of the design of traffic flow on site and possible organisational pressures made the unsafe acts 
more likely to result in an incident. 
 
2. CDM increases in value with complexity 
In general, the CDM interview process was able to establish a good understanding of the 
incident in most applications.  In complex situations, the interview was successful not only in 
establishing the story of what happened, but also the critical decisions made and the operator’s 
sensemaking related to these decisions.  With less complex events, involving simpler decisions 
the first two stages of the CDM were helpful in establishing the circumstances surrounding the 
incident.  However, if the decisions made were relatively straightforward using obvious 
environmental cues then the deepening and ‘what if’ probes did not add significantly to the 
understanding of the event.   
For example, the latter stages of CDM for the engine fire in the digger example (#7 in the results 
list) did not gain significant information because the cue of smoke and the action of pressing the 
fire suppression system was not a complex decision.  In contrast, the incident where a haul 
truck lost control whilst descending a ramp at first appeared to be a simple case of excessive 
speed for the conditions.  However, further probing in the CDM found the decisions were 
significantly more complex, such as the complex team decision on judging when wet weather 
makes conditions too dangerous. 
 
3. CDM Uncovers Important Details not in Site Investigation Reports 
Upon reviewing the incidents it was obvious to researchers that the CDM interviews often 
identified information not contained in the I-CAM report.  For example, in the incident where an 
overhead chute was impacted by a haul truck with the tray in the upright position (#4 in the 
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 results list), large colorful balls on wires – locally known as ‘idiot balls’ – were set below the 
height of the chute, and were located surrounding the area.  These serve as height indicators 
for drivers, similar to chains on low bridges or entering suburban car parks.  They would have 
usually been contacted before the chute if a tray was in the upright position.  However, a 
designated park up position for the haul truck was located past these balls.  In this park up 
location the operator raised the tray for a maintenance task and either forgot to lower it or did 
not notice that it had failed to lower before driving towards the reject bin.  The location of the 
park-up bay and the idiot balls were not included in the incident investigation, despite this 
appearing to be a contributory factor.  
Therefore, the provisional conclusion is that using the CDM method could assist in the data 
gathering and building a rich incident narrative for I-CAM or similar investigation processes. This 
provisional conclusion would be strengthened by future research where it is recommended that 
the CDM is compared directly to an I-CAM performed by an experienced investigator, more than 
one person is interviewed (to get a more complete picture) and the CDM findings are validated 
by means of both documentation reviews and through the use of additional objective incident 
data (eg photos).  Similarly, although it has been found in other domains that experts mostly 
have clear memories of salient or unusual safety-related incidents (Crandall, Klein and Hoffman, 
2006), this further research would overcome the possible argument that the current CDM 
process was applied long after the event, therefore memories could be clouded, selective or 
influenced by more recent events. 
 
4. CDM is a robust method that can be applied to a variety of situations 
As seen above, the CDM method was applied to open cut coal mining and to an underground 
gold mine. The results showed that the method was successful for both mining environments.  
Of course, these two sets of case studies are not directly comparable as the open cut coal 
mining was totally post-event and the underground gold mining totally proactive. But the 
successful use in both situations points to the possible benefits of CDM both for post-event 
analysis and for proactive risk management to explore different scenarios by which controls 
might fail and an incident might potentially result.  
Further, CDM was found to be useful with a variety of incident situations, involving different 
types of mining equipment and for both routine and non-routine situations.  
 
5. Site culture and hindsight appeared needed to be managed 
During a number of interviews it appeared that a site safety culture affected the interviewee’s 
perspective of the incidents.  Specifically, the interviewees generally appeared reluctant to 
consider the influence of a system and more likely to blame the actions of people, including their 
own.  They were often heard to use phrases like ‘I should have’ or ‘he was meant to’ and drift 
into generalisations about what was required by a specified procedure.   
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 In one case the participant noted that he and another participant shared the blame for a collision 
by not establishing positive radio contact when, in fact, it is likely that the radio system was 
unusable in the situation. Although it could be argued that they should have spoken up to have 
the radio system corrected if it didn't work properly, if the culture is to view such problems as 
failures of individuals rather than of the system (ie the safety culture was not proactive) then it is 
partially understandable that the unusable radio system was not reported here.  This reflects 
Dekker’s ‘Bad Apple Theory’ of human error where failures are introduced into a system due to 
unreliable persons and corrected by tightening procedures (Dekker, 2006). Therefore, 
occasionally it was difficult to get employees to investigate alternatives, they used phrases like 
‘that would never happen’. This was especially where investigations had already been 
undertaken and the findings had been widely disseminated. 
 
 
CDM Conclusions and Recommendations 
Overall, by focusing on decision making in real mining environments, it is contended that this 
project successfully modified and applied the CDM technique to coal mining and the comparison 
mining area. Further work to now integrate it into incident investigation and risk management 
processes are strongly recommended. In more depth, future CDM-related work in this domain 
might include the following: 
1. Refining data collection methods and tools. As mentioned earlier, the amount of time to 
collect human-related data in mining can be extremely limited. Flexible, reliable, valid 
and quick methods are needed. A shortened version of CDM, or being able to split the 
CDM session into several ‘chunks’ to fit with an operator’s free time would be valuable. 
2. Looking deeper at human error in mining incidents to understand how and why these 
errors occurred rather than to simply stopping any analysis when a ‘human error’ label 
can be attached. The label ‘Human Error’ explains nothing in itself - it does not show 
what caused the error, what could have been done to prevent it or what measures could 
be put in place to limit the occurrence of similar errors in future (Simpson, Horberry and 
Joy, 2009). This move away from the ‘train and blame’ view will help to generate a better 
understanding of the human element in incidents, and so will ultimately help develop 
safer systems. The knowledge elicitation approaches and emphasis on design for critical 
events of CDM are firmly within this framework. Ultimately it should lead to a greater 
awareness by all stakeholders in this industry (e.g. managers, designers, contractors, 
regulators, operators and maintainers) of the benefits of applying a user-centered 
approach in mining. 
3. Considering issues around motivational aspects of a task, work process or interacting 
with a piece of equipment, as these can have a strong influence on performance (e.g. 
equipment misuse). As with CDM research in other domains (Mosier and Fischer, 2009), 
the emphasis on such aspects in mining is important. 
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 4. Finally, and most concretely, further work with CDM is strongly recommended in three 
key areas: i. apply it to ‘repeat’ mobile equipment incidents, ii. employ CDM in an actual 
incident investigation (integrate, apply and evaluate it in an I-CAM investigation) and iii. 
trial the technique’s use as a proactive method, such as when introducing new controls 
or equipment (eg collision detection systems). 
Overall, focusing on how decisions are actually made by experienced operators in the field, and 
then incorporating this into designing effective mining equipment, tasks, incident investigation 
procedures and training to take these into account will be key challenges over the next 10 years 
in coal mining. The work contained in this report should form a good base upon which to 
undertake continuing systematic human factors work in mining. 
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 Part 2: Informal Feedback 
Review of Informal Feedback Literature 
The current minerals industry skills shortage has driven the need to reduce the time required for 
trainees to acquire the desired skills and experience. Many training aids for new equipment, 
including simulators and audiovisual equipment are currently being used by sites. The 
introduction of mobile simulators has further increased the availability of these training aids, 
prompting the establishment of company wide training programs designed to achieve a range of 
consistent outcomes.  
While skills acquisition mandated by training competencies is the primary outcome of most 
training programs, mining companies also strive to equip employees with the ability to recognise 
and act on hazards as part of their routine activities. Pre-start checks undertaken by operators 
address many of the hazards related to the ability of the equipment to function as expected, but 
do not necessarily address the ability of the operator to interact safely with the equipment. 
Training to identify operational hazards is generally limited to service related items that are 
essential for the equipment to function as expected. It does not always address the human 
factors hazards that operators may need to manage when they interact with the equipment.  
The ACARP project C13078 Communication strategies and mechanisms that maximise the 
effectiveness of informal/mental risk assessment programs (2007) identified the need to develop 
a process for gathering and disseminating informal feedback as a tool for improving the quality 
of informal risk assessment. This need underpins the approach to the Informal Feedback 
section of the current Knowledge Elicitation project (C18025) project, where the research 
program has been designed to develop a recognised process for workers to exchange 
information that is filtered and channelled into useful outputs.  
A variety of training delivery modes are used to train people in skills specific to coal mining 
operation and maintenance. Data gathered during the ACARP project C13078 showed a 
marked preference, by coal mining workers in both the underground and open cut sector, for 
training delivery to take the form of face to face discussions. This project did not report on 
simulator training, which was not widespread in 2004 when data collection for this project 
commenced. Simulator training offers personal ‘coaching’ style training combined with a 
practical, hands-on approach that simulates real-life operating experience without exposure to 
the actual risks associated with the task. The interaction between trainee operators and their 
trainers during simulator training is purposeful, and in the hands of a skilled trainer, can lead to 
an effective mentoring relationship when training has been completed.  
The Risk Elimination Training Aid Concept (RETAC), which was showcased at the 2006 
Queensland Mining Industry Innovation Awards, is another example of one-on-one training, 
although in this case, the trainer is separated physically from the hazards associated with the 
traditional approach to training where the trainer hangs out of the cabin while watching both the 
blade and trainee actions. Instead, the dozer is equipped with audiovisual equipment that relays 
the trainee’s actions and comments to the remotely located trainer. Audio is two-way, allowing 
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 the trainer and trainee to communicate verbally. The trainer is able to view the trainee’s actions 
with the controls in the operator workstation and the resultant dozer blade actions.   
Training aids such as simulators and the RETAC offer opportunities to capture informal, verbal 
exchanges between the experienced trainer and the novice trainee that may help to identify 
risks related to poorly designed controls and displays.  
Several Open Cut mine sites use simulators for operator training such as those developed  by 
Immersive Technologies for the CAT 797B Haul Truck. These simulators can be used for both 
screening and training purposes. The supporting software programs are designed to capture 
data about operator response rates that can be used to assess competency levels, but this data 
does not necessarily uncover design issues or information about site specific hazards that may 
impact competency levels. This type of information could be gathered through informal 
conversations with experienced operators. 
In the past few decades there have been major advances in the technology used to monitor 
machine functions and outputs, resulting in an increasingly complex arrangement of computer 
screens and associated equipment for operators to deal with in the course of routine operations. 
This increase in human machine interface has been reported by the European Agency for the 
Safety and Health at Work (2009) as an ‘emerging risk’ for all work places. The agency notes 
that the systems of work that support these complex designs are constructed as socio-technical 
systems, incorporating workers, tools, tasks and work contexts. 
While these areas have not traditionally been viewed in the same light as technical issues, 
which tend to be better understood, there is a growing awareness of their importance as 
evidenced in the Mine Safety Advisory Council’s (NSW Industry & Investment) three year OHS 
Culture Improvement Action Plan to 2012. The plan has reported the need for improved 
Associated Non-technical skills in the mining industry to support the improvement of safety 
culture in the industry.   
Scope of the project 
When the scope of this research was initially developed, the methodology for data collection 
was based on the expectation that there would be a ready supply of trainees, particularly new 
recruits, undertaking simulator training. The use of RETAC – Risk Elimination Training Aid 
Concept – was also considered, but not followed through, as RETAC was not used for haul 
truck training. By the time data collection was underway, external factors (particularly the Global 
Financial Crisis) forced a change to recruitment plans, which severely restricted the intake of 
new trainees available for participation in this research. The scope was subsequently expanded 
to include maintenance and production areas, providing opportunities to connect people and 
information across work groups.  
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 Data Collection Methods for Informal Feedback 
To capture data about informal feedback or exchanges of information between experienced 
trainers and less experienced trainees, the initial strategy was to target interactions occurring 
during simulator training as the primary source of data collection. 
An initial methodology for gathering data about interaction between trainers and trainees Was 
trialled during the first site visit. The methodology was then reviewed and finetuned for use at 
subsequent sites. 
In all, five different data collection methods were used to gather information about simulator 
training and trainer/trainee exchanges, allowing multiple perspectives to be captured. The five 
methods used were: 
1. Semi-structured interviews with trainers to gain an understanding of the training 
process in place and the extent of the training material 
2. Observations made during training sessions, including coaching tips about verbal & 
non-verbal cues designed to help trainees to develop the required operational skills  
3. Scrutinising simulator session reports to gain a good understanding of the desired 
training outcomes related to trainee performance during routine and critical events 
4. Structured interviews with trainees to gather information about their experience levels  
5. Semi-structured interviews with trainees conducted post training to collect feedback 
about the training experience 
Limitations of the data collection methodology 
Post-training interviews with trainees at one site revealed that the reason for a new instruction 
about braking was not fully understood or appreciated by trainers or trainees. The new process 
had been prompted by maintenance concerns about unusual wear and tear, but as the reason 
for the change was not communicated to either the trainer or trainees, there was a very good 
likelihood that trainees would not adopt the practice once they were back in the field. This 
scenario suggested that simulator training data of trainer / trainee interactions represented only 
one aspect of the information exchange required for quality training outcomes.  
The narrow scope of data collection and fewer than expected participants prompted a change to 
the scope of data collection for the remainder of the project. The agreed solution was to 
broaden the scope of data collection to include interviews with personnel working in the related 
areas of haul truck operation and maintenance.   
The revised scope of remaining data collection was outlined to site training personnel and 
agreement reached to develop interview templates for data collection from the wider work 
system as shown in Figure 4 below. 
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Additional data collection to encompass the wider work system 
Data collection methods used to gather data about information exchanged across the targeted 
work areas – Training, Operation & Maintenance – included semi-structured interviews based 
on the interview template shown in Appendix 5. The aim of these interviews was to establish the 
topics most commonly discussed in relation to:  
• Skill levels, behaviours and performance of haul truck operators 
• Issues impacting on the safe operation and maintenance of the equipment 
 
Participants were also asked to estimate the strength of each interaction node by rating the 
frequency of communication according to the following table: 
 
Table 2  Communication frequency measures 
0 Never Never 
1 Rarely 1-3 times per month 
2 Occasionally 1-3 times per rotation/week
3 Often More than once per shift 
Figure 4 shows the wider work system to be 
targeted for data collection 
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 During these interviews participants were asked to comment on communication flow patterns 
and likely strengths of interactions, prompted by a diagram showing possible interaction among 
people across different work areas. As comments on the actual communication flow were 
provided, the diagram was updated and the latest version shown to the next participant. This 
interative process was continued across all three participating sites producing a broad view of 
communication flow across the production, maintenance and training work areas (see Figure 14 
on page 44). 
 
In total, 33 people from within the training, maintenance and production work areas participated 
across the three sites, covering the roles shown in Table 3 below. 
Table 3 List of participants 
Participant role Number of participants 
Trainee 10 
Simulator trainer/assessor 6 
Training & Safety 6 
Trainer – maintenance 2 
Maintenance supervisor/superintendent 2 
Maintenance reliability engineer 1 
Maintainer 1 
Operator 2 
Pre-strip Supervisor 1 
Production Coordinator 1 
Contractor - H& S Advisor, maintenance 1 
 
 
Informal Feedback Findings  
Participants were extremely cooperative and provided valuable insights into the communication 
practices occurring at site.  
 
Findings from observations of, and interviews about, simulator training  
1. Overview of the simulator training program (more detail in Appendix 6) 
Simulator training for new starters was well planned. The approach was similar at each site, with 
scope for individual trainer/assessors to drive effectiveness in different ways according to their 
skills and abilities. The simulator software module being used for instruction (Caterpillar 797B) 
could be configured for a range of events or scenarios to test developing skills according to the 
34 
 
 requirements for operator training. These included skills for dumping, loading, braking in 
emergency situations and responses that demonstrated their ability to respond to non-routine 
situations such as rocks on the haul road.  
Generally, simulator trainers took new trainees undertaking the haul truck operator package 
through three discreet stages: 
1. The Pre-simulator familiarisation session  
2. The initial simulator session  
3. Additional simulator training sessions to develop and assess skills for 
a. Routine haul truck operation  
b. Operator responses to critical events   
The next step in the skills acquisition process was spent out in the field under an assigned 
trainer/mentor. When the field trainer considered the trainee had gained the desired level of 
competence, the trainee’s skill level was assessed via a session in the simulator. The computer 
printout provided an unbiased assessment of the trainee’s ability to perform specified tasks.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Pre-simulator 
familiarisation session 
for new starters includes 
an introduction to 
terminology and symbols 
used for quick and easy 
recognition, as depicted 
in this photo. 
 
 
 
The obvious advantage of simulator training over other training delivery modes is that it offers a 
‘safe’ way to learn new skills. Training aids built into the program (eg on screen messages) help 
to improve situational awareness and understanding, particularly when reinforced by input from 
the trainer. The system can be paused at any time during training to focus the discussion on the 
reasons for particular situations occurring. 
More experienced operators undertaking simulator training agreed with its value for refresher 
training for emergency response skills, although considered the virtual reality environment not 
‘real’ enough for people with field experience.   
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 2. Trainer skills and abilities 
Simulator trainers were generally experienced operators with prior experience as field 
trainer/assessors and formal training qualifications. The experience level of simulator trainers 
was a key factor in determining their ability to explain confidently why certain actions should be 
taken, and was seriously impeded when they had no practical experience with or knowledge of 
new procedures.  
Trainers adopted a coaching style of training delivery, using a combination of instructional and 
mentoring techniques, based on the skill level of the trainee. In the initial stage of training, 
new starters received detailed instructions for routine tasks and procedures that had to be 
memorised and followed without deviation. When trainees progressed to the field experience 
stage, they were required to log the day’s work with the simulator trainer, a strategy which 
facilitated the mentoring process. This ongoing contact also provided time for the trainer to 
establish a relationship of trust with the trainee, providing the building blocks for effective 
communication about what was happening in the field and for ongoing mentoring once the 
trainee graduated to operator status.  
The skills of the simulator trainer to coach, mentor, customise training for new starters with 
some level of prior experience, and to maintain currency of site specific conditions, appeared to 
be key factors that influenced the quality of training outcomes, although these were not 
analysed as part of this current research.  
Simulator training was also used to refresh skills and to practice those that could not be done 
during normal operation, such as training for response to engine fires. While initial skills training 
was well planned, refresher training tended to occur on an ad hoc basis when conditions in the 
field and availability of operators provided an opportunity, rather than as an integral part of 
further skills development and optimisation. Refresher training could be triggered by incidents 
involving mobile equipment, changes to mine rules and routine operation or unplanned 
maintenance that may be occurring due to less than adequate operator was one source of 
information used to trigger refresher training needs.  
3. Simulator scenarios 
Three scenarios were identified (loading, dumping and engine fire) where verbal exchange and 
trainer feedback played a significant role in trainee acquisition of skills. Information was 
collected about the type of prompts that trainers use to prepare trainees for scenarios where 
responses are measured by the simulator computer.  
Trainees were introduced to the use of sensory cues to perfect routine tasks such as dumping 
and loading. The trainer pointed out visual and audible cues and then used a range of prompts, 
reminders and warnings to help them through the learning process. Shadows on the bund wall 
(Fig.6 below) were used to judge how far back to take the vehicle. Cues such as this helped to 
minimise the time required to position the truck ready for loading or dumping, which was an 
important factor in the truck loading & dumping production cycle. Timing is considered an 
important skill as loading that delays the following trucks may lead to risk taking behaviours by 
other operators in an attempt to make up time lost during delays. 
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Figure 6 Trainees use visual 
cues such as shadows to guide 
them during the dumping 
scenario  
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis of the data collected about non-verbal cues, such as the positioning of the dozer blade 
to confirm where the operator should locate the truck in relation to the dozer, indicated that 
these types of cues should not be relied upon as the sole means of positive communication 
between vehicles. This non-verbal cue is a soft control measure that could be made more 
effective by adding confirmation and comprehension of the message by 2-way.  
2-way radio communiqués can also be unreliable because of poor quality transmission, 
transmission failure and the need to interpret the audible message for its exact meaning eg the 
instruction “bring it back” from dozer to truck operator doesn’t clearly indicate “where the vehicle 
should be brought”. The language that develops within a crew working closely together can 
easily be misinterpreted by someone joining the crew for the first time, with dire consequences. 
Additional feedback about how well tasks were being performed was provided by the 
simulator software. Messages appearing on the ‘windscreen’ section of the simulator 
covered start up procedures, routine and critical tasks, while information about engine 
speed, oil pressure etc was delivered via a display built into the dash (Fig.7).Figure 7 The 
photo to the left shows how trainees a
informed about the position of their haul 
truck during the loading scenario. The 
trainer enriches this information by 
explaining the importance of truck 
position for ensuring that coal is loaded 
in the planned timeframe.  
re 
 
Trainers also explained the reasoning 
behind the specific sequence of actions 
and the adverse outcomes that could 
ensue if these were not followed. This 
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 mentoring approach was used to help the trainee gain situational awareness and to enhance 
decision making skills during routine tasks such as the dumping sequence outlined below. 
Table 4 below demonstrates the nature of the input about the dumping scenario provided 
by the simulator trainer to improve the trainee’s understanding of the task  
SCENARIO WHAT/HOW to do it (Instructions for the task) 
WHAT to look/listen for 
(Cues for Situational 
Awareness) 
WHY (Reasoning 
behind the Decision 
Making) 
Backing up 
to bund wall 
Put into reverse  
Back up until shadow is 
at a certain point on 
bund wall 
Visual cues help to 
minimise time taken 
to perform the task  
Dumping 
Pull retarder on Æ into 
neutral Æ apply park 
brake Æ release retarder 
Æ raise tray Æ dump load 
Check the gauge for 
1500 revs 
Avoid heating engine 
oil 
 
Lowering tray 
& driving off 
let hoist down Æ into first 
gear Æ release retarder Æ 
idle away from bund wall 
Æ tray down Æ drive on 
Check position of body 
as it comes down while 
idling away from bund 
wall 
Idling while lowering 
tray reduces time 
required to lower tray 
& drive off  
 
4. Training evaluation 
Following each simulator session, trainers used computer reports to facilitate feedback about 
how well trainees performed each routine task or event, a process which helped them 
understand the required training outcomes and provide a focus for improvement. The session 
report provided some information about the specific components of each task that had not been 
performed correctly.  
The session report provided limited data about critical or non-routine events, such as the 
response to engine fire and loss of function (brakes, oil pressure). Feedback was generally 
limited to a ‘success’ or ‘failure’ statement. It was up to each trainer to help explain why the 
trainee had succeeded or failed the task and to reinforce the need to react quickly and know the 
best exit strategy if required. 
 
5. Trainee evaluation of simulator training 
Trainees who were completely new to mining and haul truck operation considered simulator 
training to be a safe and effective way to develop basic skills and gain confidence before being 
exposed to the reality of the pre-strip or production environment. 
Experienced operators undertaking simulator training for the first time were more critical of the 
inadequacies of the simulator software in replicating the exact situation at site. Some issues, 
such as signs showing the speed limit in miles per hour instead of kilometres per hour, could be 
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 easily updated, but others posed more of a challenge. The sense of real danger during an 
engine fire was difficult to replicate, but the race against the clock to complete the emergency 
response actions precisely within a given time limit, provided a different challenge that 
enhanced the learning process.  
6. Training triggers 
For experienced operators, simulator training offers an opportunity to refresh skills and to 
exchange information with trainers about issues that may be impacting optimal operation. While 
initial skills training sessions were well planned, refresher training tended to occur on an ad hoc 
basis when conditions in the field and availability of operators provided an opportunity, rather 
than as an integral part of further skills development and optimisation.  
Refresher training could be triggered by incidents involving mobile equipment, changes to mine 
rules and routine operation or unplanned maintenance that may be occurring due to less than 
adequate operator performance. Assessment of the data provided via the MINEcare program, 
which is part of the despatch module, is a useful source of information that can be used to 
trigger refresher training needs.  
7. Equipment design issues 
During the course of training information was sometimes elicited about problems with the design 
of equipment, although most people accepted poor design as a matter of course, expecting that 
the onus would be on them to make adjustments to their operating techniques to account for 
design limitations. Feedback about potential improvements to the simulator software and useful 
data outputs was provided to simulator programmers for input to the next update of the training 
module. 
One equipment design issue that came to light during data collection was the impact of 
changing from a steering wheel to toggles. This major design change impacted on the trainer 
initially, as the experienced operator had no experience with equipment driven by toggles, so 
would have been unable to act as mentor to any new recruits.   
Another equipment design issue is identified in the photos below, taken either side of the trainee 
operator during a simulator training session. The trainee was unaware that the indicator light 
was on as he was unable to see it from his position at the wheel. The message that was sent, 
inadvertently to vehicles in near proximity of the truck is another example of the unreliability of 
non-verbal cues. In this case, the equipment design is a major contributor to the problem, rather 
than ‘language’ that differs from one site to the next. 
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Indicator light can be 
seen when standing to 
the left of the trainee 
Indicator light not 
visible to trainee 
from this position 
Figures 8 & 9 The green indicator light on dash is not visible to the operator (as per the 
view in the right hand photo).  
 
Findings across the wider work system 
1. Topics covered during semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews with participants in the wider work system drew out a number of 
common themes: 
• Simulator training strategies for new starters 
o Training to improve emergency response skills 
o Training to provide new starters (and others) with heightened awareness of 
site specific conditions, sensory cues  
o Training to identify issues associated with the introduction and ongoing use of 
new technologies 
o Training to improve/refresh operator skills identified by interrogating reliability 
data.  
o Knowledge elicitation and engagement with targeted operators and 
maintenance workers 
• Information elicited from experts in the field that adds value to simulator training 
o Sources 
o Knowledge elicitation tools 
• Refresher training needs and strategies 
o Operator behaviours that impact on equipment reliability and safety 
o Technology changes eg hydraulics replacing winches 
o Equipment design changes 
o Unscheduled maintenance 
• Sensory cues 
o Non-verbal cues that impacted on safe operation 
• Communication (further detail in Appendix 7) 
o Communication flow across production, maintenance & training work areas 
o Communication strategies to enhance workforce engagement 
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2. Strength of interactions (detailed analysis in Appendix 8) 
Data collected via the interaction nodes template and associated interviews provided an image 
of the flow of communication across the training, production and maintenance work groups. In 
analysing these self reported interactions, the frequency of interaction was used to indicate the 
strength of the relationship between those interacting, the interactants, with a measure of 3 
being considered a strong relationship (see Table 2 on page 33). No attempt was made to 
identify the factors influencing the frequency of interaction.   
 
Figure 10 below shows the reported strength of interaction between training personnel and 
others within the wider work system. It is interesting to note that the simulator trainer/assessor 
at each site generally had a strong relationship with other training personnel and those in the 
operational work area. On the other hand, the relationship with the maintenance area shows no 
real consistency. This finding may reflect individual relationships established on a personal 
basis or through prior work experience.  
 
 
0
1
1
2
2
3
3
Reported Interaction Strengths between 
Training Personnel and associated work areas
Simulator Trainer/Assessor
Simulator Trainer/Assessor
Simulator Trainer/Assessor
Simulator Trainer/Assessor
Training Supervisor
Safety Training Coordinator 
(contractor)
Training, Safety Improvement
Training Advisor ‐ maintenance
Training Advisor ‐ maintenance
Maintenance trainer
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 Figure 11 below shows the reported strength of interaction between maintenance personnel 
and others within the wider work system. There appeared to be no clear pattern of interaction 
strength, even between interactants within the maintenance area. Again, the reported 
interactions may be influenced by a number of factors, including individual relationships 
established on a personal basis, prior work experience and/or the organisational design of the 
different work areas. 
 
0
1
1
2
2
3
3
Reported Interaction Strengths between 
Maintenance Personnel & associated work areas
Mobile Maintenance 
Superintendent
Maintainer / limited training 
role
Reliability Engineer
Figure 12 below shows the reported strength of interaction between operations personnel and 
others within the wider work system.  
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 3. Development of the communication flowchart 
At the commencement of the second phase of data collection, incorporating the wider work 
system, a simplistic model of the anticipated interaction nodes and associated communication 
flow was presented to participants from other work areas (see Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13 shows the initial model of the interaction nodes 
and communication flow used to prompt development of 
the final flow chart 
The iterative process described in the data collection methods section of this report was used to 
construct a detailed image of interactions across the three work groups. Reported interaction 
strengths were used to refine the communication flowchart and produce the final version 
depicted in Figure 14.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 14 Final version of the Communication Flowchart 
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 Interactions where decision making may occur are represented by dotted arrows. The strength 
of interaction is represented by the colour coding shown in the table below. In the case of an 
unscheduled breakdown, the maintenance trainer/assessor could bridge the communication gap 
by taking on a networking role. 
 
Table 6 
 Communication frequency measures 
0 Never Never 
1 Rarely 1-3 times per month 
2 Occasionally 1-3 times per rotation/week
3 Often More than once per shift 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall, the four simulator trainer/assessors had developed strong relationships with all training 
personnel, including other trainer/assessors, trainees and the key decision maker in the training 
department. Three of the four also reported regular interactions with production personnel and 
one trainer also interacted more than once a shift with the maintenance work group and the 
OEM and/or dealer. 
The Training Supervisor (representative of the key decision maker in the Training Department) 
reported most frequent interaction with the simulator trainer/assessor. The Production 
Coordinator frequently interacted with the trainee, the operations area, maintenance and the 
OEM representative, indicating that this person should be well informed about activities across 
the three work groups. The Pre-strip Supervisor was frequently in touch with the field trainer, 
trainee and experienced operator, as well as regularly interacting with the maintenance 
supervisor. The reliability engineer and health & safety personnel also reported regular 
interaction with maintenance.  
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Maintenance centred interactions and communication flow 
In the diagram below, the workshop planner is a key player in the management of scheduled 
and unscheduled maintenance, with clear lines of communication to both maintenance and 
production decision makers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Interaction types 
Initial analysis of the data collected during semi-structured interviews with participants across 
the wider work system indicated that there were three main types of verbal interactions 
occurring – Knowledge Elicitation, Mentoring and Training interactions.  
 
1. Knowledge elicitation interactions  
a. Purpose - problem solving/investigative  
b. Triggered primarily by reporting systems 
c. Also triggered by mentoring and/or training interactions 
d. May be simple or complex (example of complex knowledge elicitation interaction 
shown below) 
e. People – trainer/assessor interacts (planned/formal) with reporting system &/or 
operator, production supervisor, production decision maker, training decision 
maker 
Workshop 
Maintainer 
Operator 
Production 
shift 
supervisor 
Maintenance 
shift supervisor 
Breakdown 
fitter 
Workshop 
Planner 
DON’T FIX 
FIX 
SAP
FIX 
SAP
DON’T FIX 
Pre‐start checks  
Figure 15 shows the interactions and communication flow during 
nd unscheduled maintenance scheduled a
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 2. Mentoring interactions 
a. Purpose – advisory 
b. Triggered primarily by mentee (operator) 
c. Usually simple 
d. People – simulator or field trainer/assessor interacts (planned/informal) with 
operator outside the planned training session 
3. Training interactions 
a. Purpose –skills development/refresher training  
b. Triggered by training matrix for new starters &/or investigations identifying the 
need for enhancement/refreshment of existing skills 
c. Usually simple 
d. People – trainer/assessor interacts with trainee during planned training 
(field/simulator) and debriefing (based on computer report) following simulator 
training 
 
Examples of interactions occurring across the wider work system 
 
Table 7 below provides some examples of these interaction types and the manner in which they 
are used or could be used to assist with training. 
 
Interaction 
Type 
Topic Interactants Description Training Strategy 
Knowledge 
Elicitation 
Training 
documentation 
Simulator 
trainer & field 
trainer 
Conversation with 
field trainer who 
requests training 
documents to 
ensure currency of 
documentation 
Conversation can 
also be used to 
ensure training has 
been approved by 
the responsible 
person 
Strategy to keep 
field trainers up to 
date & to discover 
any issues in the 
field – change 
management tool 
 Excessive fuel 
consumption 
Maintenance, 
MINEcare 
interrogator, 
simulator 
trainer, 
operators 
Experts share 
experience to 
identify the factors 
causing excessive 
fuel consumption 
If operator skill is 
implicated, correct 
this via mentoring, 
follow with formal 
training if necessary 
 Overfilling 
while refuelling  
Operator and 
OEM service 
rep  
Design 
modifications to 
bring fill points to 
eye level mean that 
there is a delay in 
the levels adjusting 
OEM service rep 
provides training 
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 Interaction 
Type 
Topic Interactants Description Training Strategy 
Mentoring Critical events 
eg oil puddles 
Simulator 
trainer & 
operator/trainee 
operator 
Learnings from 
incidents used to 
remind operators of 
the best way to deal 
safely with oil 
puddles that may be 
on the haul road 
Informal refresher 
training – at pre-
start meetings or 
other convenient 
times to update skills 
and situational 
awareness  
Training Routine 
scenarios 
Simulator 
trainer & 
trainee operator
Detailed instruction 
about the actions, 
timing of actions, 
visual cues need to 
hone the skills 
required to perform 
the dumping 
sequence safely & 
with precision 
Refresher training 
– via a sequential 
learning process to 
help embed the 
procedure and to 
elicit information 
about problem areas 
 
 
Communication triggers, drivers, barriers and training needs identification 
The data has also identified communication barriers and drivers that have the potential to 
weaken or strengthen the effectiveness of verbal interactions.  
Barriers: Negative cultural attitudes, inadequate leadership skills, rapidly changing workforce, 
an organisational framework that does not link decision makers with the communication 
process, resulting in a ‘dead end’ process, physical barriers such as the location of offices and 
access to information, although the latter can also be used positively to manage documentation,    
Drivers: Networkers who can connect ‘strangers’, effective leadership skills, positive cultural 
attitudes, stable workforce (relationships take time to develop).  
Triggers  that prompt the need for knowledge elicitation to identify the best pathway for 
improvements include data on truck wear & tear re brakes, gears, tyres, techniques to optimize 
economy of operation (use more fuel changing gears, therefore need to reduce gear shift 
changes). 
 
Development of the model of verbal interactions for workforce 
engagement 
The findings outlined in the previous section were used to construct a model of verbal 
interactions that could be used as a process for improving training outcomes by gathering 
information about haul truck operations (see Figure 16  below).   
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  Fig. 16 Workforce Engagement Model 
 
DECISION 
MAKING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model connects each interaction type in a way that faciltates useful and purposeful 
responses to the outcomes of each interaction. An effective communication flow on its own is 
not sufficient to produce positive outcomes. Decision making is needed to move the outcomes 
of one interaction type on to the next logical step in the process. It is envisaged that the key 
driver would be the person who identifies the point at which decision making should occur and 
who communicates the decision making outcomes to the other interactants. 
This model is intended to provide a process for continual improvement in a dynamic work 
envrionment where change is constantly occurring.The process for improving performance as a 
training outcome could be initiated by a range of triggers that prompt the need for knowledge to 
be elicited from experienced people at the ‘coalface’. The knowledge elicitation techniques used 
for this purpose could include the Critical Decision Method (CDM).  
 
Informal Feedback Discussion 
How the model might be implemented 
The model incorporating the three predominant types of verbal exchanges suggests a process 
that could be used to achieve a range of continuous improvement and efficiency outcomes 
related to haul truck operation (see Figure 17 below).
DECISION 
MAKING 
DECISION 
MAKING 
 
DRIVER 
Mentoring  
Knowledge 
elicitation 
Training 
TRIGGER 
 49 
 
 
 
Figure 17 
 
 
Model of workforce Engagement for Improved Performance and
Efficiency through Simulator Training Initiatives 
         
Mentoring interactions 
¾ Purpose ‐ advisory  
¾ Triggers – investigation outcomes, 
mentee/operator queries 
¾ Sim
SIMULATOR 
TRAINER 
The HUB of the 
process 
Knowledge elicitation interactions 
¾ Purpose ‐ problem solving/investigative  
¾ Triggers ‐ reporting systems, mentoring 
and/or training interactions 
¾ Simple or complex interactions
ple interactions
Training interactions 
¾ Purpose – skills development, refresher training 
¾ Triggers – training matrix, 
investigation/knowledge elicitation  outcomes 
¾ Simple interactions
DECISION 
MAKING 
DECISION 
MAKING TRIGGER 
DECISION 
MAKING 
Improved training outcomes 
9 Response & decision making during emergencies 
(eg engine fire, brake failure) 
9 Operating skills and behaviours that improve 
equipment  reliability & performance 
 In general, knowledge elicitation interactions are potentially useful for identifying mentoring 
and training needs.  The outcomes of knowledge elicitation interactions could be utilised in a 
number of ways. They might be used to identify the root cause of equipment related problems 
early in their development so that a timely response to these issues can be determined. If a 
single operator’s performance is implicated, the decision could be made to mentor that operator 
for the purpose of modifying behaviours that may be contributing to poor performance. If the 
problem appears widespread amongst operators, the decision might be taken to provide 
refresher training for the entire crew or focus on issues with the equipment that may be 
contributing to the problem.   
Findings from the CDM section of this report support the concept of using knowledge elicitation 
interactions to identify mentoring and training needs. The findings and key decisions in Incident 
#7, for example, demonstrate the role of experience and decision making in preventing an 
engine fire. Similarly, Incident #10 identified glare from the sun causing temporary loss of vision 
for the operator as a common cause of misalignment when backing up to the shovel. The trainer 
might also add to this information by explaining that positioning of the truck is a key factor in 
ensuring a full load performed in a short timeframe. Timing is considered an important skill as 
loading that delays the following trucks may lead to risk taking behaviours by other operators in 
an attempt to catch up following delays.  
Delays in loading also produce situations that are likely to result in vehicle to vehicle collisions, 
which are exacerbated by poor visibility due to the truck design. The recent introduction of 
proximity detection equipment is an area which could be investigated by applying knowledge 
elicitation techniques such as CDM and incorporating the CDM findings into a training needs 
assessment using the verbal interaction model. 
Mentoring and training interactions, in turn, may also flag the existence of problems not 
identified by reporting systems, although their primary purpose would be to rectify problems.  
Knowledge elicited during problem solving and mentoring or training interactions could be used 
to improve the range of operator capabilities that new starters might be expected to develop 
during simulator training. Simulator trainers could coach trainees to develop more advanced 
skills for routine tasks, such as situational awareness and decision making, before taking their 
first steps into the operational area.  
Experienced operators, particularly those who are field trainers, could also benefit by including 
non-routine events in the refresher training program. Engine fire and loss of brake function are 
two events that demand good decision making skills and quick actions to prevent the situation 
from escalating. Field trainers could refresh their own skills before passing them on to other 
operators, a process that would provide consistency in training about new or modified skills. 
Used for this purpose, the verbal interactions model could be considered a change 
management tool. Where refresher training is used to introduce new equipment designs or 
modifications to existing equipment, knowledge elicitation could be expected to produce useful 
outcomes for OEM designers.  
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 Drivers 
An effective communication flow on its own is not sufficient to produce positive outcomes using 
the model described above. To succeed, the process needs to be driven by a central networker 
who has access to people within the associated work areas, and who is able to influence key 
decision makers. The research findings about interaction strengths indicate that the simulator 
trainer would be the ideal driver for improvements to haul truck operation, while in the 
maintenance section, it is suggested that the workshop planner or maintenance trainer/assessor 
could fulfil this role. 
It is interesting to note that the simulator trainer/assessor at each site generally had a strong 
relationship with other training personnel and those in the operational work area. The 
relationship with the maintenance area was not consistently strong, perhaps influenced by the 
individual relationships established on a personal basis or through prior work experience and 
the organisational design of the different work areas that separates maintenance from training 
and operations. The design of shift rosters and a rapidly changing workforce are two issues that 
could impact negatively on networking and information flow as it takes time to build relationships 
and trust between individuals.  
The characteristics of this role have not been fully assessed, but are likely to be built around 
peer respect, good networking skills, office based, and, most importantly, recognised expertise. 
Trainer coaching ability is an important attribute when helping trainees to understand the finer 
points of tasks such as dumping and loading, as the simulator session reports provide feedback 
about how well the trainee has aligned the truck, but is not able to explain WHY the trainee 
succeeded or failed. 
 
Interaction Type Networker role 
Knowledge 
elicitation 
Networker(simulator trainer/assessor) interacts with reporting system 
&/or operator, production supervisor, production decision maker, 
training decision maker 
Mentoring Networker(simulator or field trainer/assessor) interacts 
(planned/informal) with operator outside planned training sessions 
Training Networker (simulator or field trainer/assessor) interacts with trainee 
during planned training; also during debriefing (based on computer 
report) following simulator training 
 
 
A simple version of the communication flowchart (Figure 18) has been constructed to show how 
knowledge elicitation could be effected by drawing on a strong relationship between the 
maintenance and operational trainer/assessors. The suggested steps in the knowledge 
elicitation process are outlined below 
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Step Description Interaction Outcome  
1 Trainer monitors reports (eg incidents, reliability 
data) that trigger issues with either equipment 
or operator performance 
Provides information about 
equipment performance; ongoing 
patterns suggest if cause is operator 
or equipment driven 
2 Trainer chats to operator informally to identify 
issues (equipment &/or operator) that might be 
contributing to less than optimal performance 
Provides operator input re the likely 
causal factors & thinking behind 
operator behaviours 
3 Trainer verifies equipment issues with 
workshop personnel 
DECISION re causes 
4 Trainer discusses training needs with 
supervisor/production personnel 
DECISION re training needs 
 
Figure 18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Production 
Decision Maker
Training 
Decision 
Maker
Maintenance 
Trainer/Assessor 
Workshop 
Planner 
TRIGGER 
OPERATOR 
Production 
Supervisor 
2 
1 
Operational 
Trainer/Assessor 
4
3
 
Barriers 
While barriers to free flowing communication may be viewed negatively, they may also be used 
to good effect. For instance, where version control of documents is important, restricting access 
to people in the training office forces the field trainers to interact with office based &/or simulator 
trainers. This forced interaction is an opportunity for both simulator trainer & field trainer to keep 
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 in touch with what’s happening in the field (sim trainer) & to keep up to date with paperwork 
requirements (field trainer).  
Informal Feedback Conclusions and Recommendations 
Overall, based on the process of workforce engagement for effecting improved operator 
performance and efficiency, it is contended that this project successfully collected data and built 
a model of how informal feedback in the form of verbal interactions could be harnessed to 
gather information about haul truck design issues, training gaps, communication barriers and 
drivers. The following points should be considered carefully when applying this model for the 
purpose of improving training outcomes based on simulator training. 
• Simulator training is a useful tool for initial skills training, particularly for new starters, and 
has the potential to be utilised for improved training outcomes, including  
o Improved response and decision making during emergencies 
o Improved operating skills and behaviours that improve equipment reliability and 
performance 
• Experience level, coaching style, communication and interpersonal skills of trainers are 
important factors in successful delivery of training, and they may vary from trainer to 
trainer  
• Simulator training to introduce or refresh skills needs to be reinforced by an 
understanding of its purpose in relation to haul truck operation- this is especially true 
when new technologies (eg collision detection systems) are introduced into the vehicle  
• Simulator trainers need well developed networking skills to ensure access to current 
information about equipment performance and reliability from both the production and 
maintenance areas  
• Refresher training is an opportunity to assess and monitor operational and emergency 
skill levels, introduce new skills and/or changes to existing procedures 
• Refresher training can also be used as a means to correct operator behaviours that 
impact on equipment reliability and safety and to identify and update missing or poorly 
developed skills 
This overall strategy represents a human factors approach to improving communication across 
three key areas of the business - training, operations & maintenance – by implementing a 
process that fits comfortably with the characteristics of the workforce. 
The future step with this research is to validate the model by incorporating it as a training 
strategy to improve situational awareness and decision making targeting a priority area such as 
proximity detection and collision avoidance systems. It is hoped that this can be achieved by 
means of future ACARP-funded research.  
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 Appendices 
Appendix 1: Critical Decision Method - Detailed Four Stage Process 
Description 
Stage 1: Select Incident 
1) Go through the information and consent forms with the participant. 
a) Give them the information form. 
b) Explain the experiment. 
c) Get them to sign the consent form. 
 
2) Screen Incidents with the participant and select one that is appropriate. 
a) Must be an active decision maker. 
b) Must be a critical decision – a decision of importance that was a factor in an incident.  In this case 
it will usually be where a significant accident/negative consequence was, or was not, avoided 
based on the decision of the operator. 
c) Should relate to Safety and/or Equipment Design if possible. 
 
3) Get the participant to give an outline of the incident. 
a) One interviewer to lead the discussion. 
b) The other to type the incident into a laptop computer. 
c) Either can interrupt if necessary. 
 
Stage 2: Construct a Timeline 
1) Interviewer who was using the laptop repeats the entire incident back to the participant. 
a) Ask the participant to correct wrong information. 
b) Ask the participant make additions to the incident. 
 
2) Interviewer who is not repeating the incident creates the information into “chunks” - task stages. 
a) May write the chucks on a whiteboard 
b) May write the chunks on card - template printed 4 to a page. 
 
3) Sequence the chunks of information. 
a) Likely to already be in order. 
b) Add time if time is important in the situation. 
c) Lay the chunks out on the table in front of the participant. 
 
4) Decide at what points Critical Decisions were made. 
a) This might solely related to the outcome of the incident. 
b) It might also relate to the goals of the exercise (eg equipment design issues.) 
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 Stage 3: Deepening Understanding 
1) Go through each critical chunk one at a time using the following probes to get improved information. 
Cues What were you seeing, hearing, smelling, noticing etc.? 
Information What information did you use in making this judgement? 
How, where and from whom did you get this information? 
What did you do with the information? 
Analogues Where you reminded of any previous experience? 
What about that previous experience seemed relevant to this case? 
Standard Operating 
Procedures 
Does this case fit a standard or particular scenario? 
Is this a type of event you are trained to deal with? 
Goals and Priorities What were your specific goals and objectives at the time? 
What was the most important thing to accomplish at this point? 
Options What other courses of action were considered or available to you? 
How this option was chosen or others were rejected? 
Was there a rule you were following in choosing this option? 
Experience What specific training or experience was necessary or helpful in making this 
decision? 
Assessment Suppose you were asked to describe this situation to some else at this 
point.  How would you summarise the situation? 
Mental Models Did you imagine the possible consequences of this action? 
Did you create some sort of picture in your head? 
Did you imagine the events and how they would unfold? 
Decision Making What let you know that this was the right thing to do at this point in the 
incident? 
How much time pressure was involved in making this decision? 
How long did it actually take to make this decision? 
Guidance Did you seek any guidance at this point in the incident? 
How did you know to trust the guidance you got? 
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 Stage 4: What if Questions 
 
1) Go through each chunk one at a time using the following probes to get improved information. 
 
Expert Novice 
Contrast 
If a novice had been in charge at this particular point in the incident, what 
type of error might she or he have made and why?   
Would they have noticed what you noticed?  
Would they have known to do [key feature]? 
Hypotheticals If [key feature] of the situation had been different, what impact would it have 
had on your decision/assessment/actions/plans? 
Experience What training might have offered an advantage in this situation? 
Aids What knowledge, information or tools/technologies would have been 
useful/helped in this situation? 
 
58 
 
 Appendix 2: CDM Data Collection Sheets 
Participant ID: 
Notes from Stage 1 and 2 
(type details of incident and timeline) 
 
Extra information from Stages 3 and 4 
Critical Chunk (INSERT ID) (INSERT NAME) 
Cues  
Information  
Analogues  
Standard Operating 
Procedures 
 
 
Goals and Priorities  
Options  
Experience  
Assessment  
Mental Models  
Decision Making  
Guidance  
Expert Novice 
Contrast 
 
 
Hypotheticals  
Experience  
Aids  
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 Appendix 3: Example of Raw Data Collected for CDM 
 
Incident : Hit Dump tray. 
 
Stages 1 and 2.  
• Incident occurred approximately 3 years ago whilst full time operator. 
• Doing reject the entire day.  Started at 6am.  Had been on shift for about 6 hours. 
• You can take off from the dump with the tray still up BUT it should only work in 1st gear. 
• You put the transition into 6th immediately but it stops in 1st until the tray is down. 
• Takes approximately 10 seconds for the tray to go down. 
• With tray up you can idle out in first but once you get over 8km then the tray alarm 
activates – in first you can get up to 11km. 
• When the tray is up you can see it on a display but if you go over 8km there is audible 
alarm. 
• Once you press the tray down switch it comes down automatically. 
• All day it had been “up shifting” the entire shift with the tray up.  Notified the maintenance 
crew that this was occurring and maintenance vehicle eventually came out (low priority). 
• It was an auto electrician who came. 
• Noted that it was a low priority because it wasn’t annoying and not stopping production. 
• When he was getting close to the reject bins the electrician called up he stopped the 
vehicle. 
• Near the reject bins there was a designated parking area – all this work has to be near 
the designated parking area. 
• The electrician asked him to put the tray up. 
• Got out of the truck. 
• Put the lock on to isolate the tray. 
• On the deck of the truck.  Electrician goes and does something. 
• Electrician informs that he thinks has fixed the problem. 
• Electrician asked him to put the tray down and give it a test run. 
• Electrician was in a dicky seat. 
• Because the road was rough was taking it steady and only 50m from the reject bin (if 
had been longer then it was rough.) So you never got over 8km.  Also driving slower with 
electrician in the dicky seat because it’s rough. 
• Forgot to pull the leaver to push the leaver tray back down. 
• Knew that the tray came into contact with reject bin – required structural engineers from 
Mackay to check the bin and they got it running again. 
• Didn’t notice that the light was on. 
• I-CAM was done the next week. 
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 Stage 3: Key Decision = Decide to take off with the tray still up 
• Decided to take it slow. 
• Have started the truck with the tray up but rarely (2-3 times) 
• 99% of the time you start off with the tray down. 
• Goals, getting from a to b and also not want to give the bloke a rough ride. 
• Chatting the whole time. 
• There was no time pressure. 
• On the reject bin there is a ‘red light’ that shows if the reject is filling up.  When the red 
light comes on for along time the process plant shuts down.  However at this time there 
was no time constraints and production pressure. 
• Notes that the display for the ‘tray up’ is on the left of the dashboard – during the day it’s 
not necessarily easy to see (sun, covered in dust, bulb going). 
• There was no visual from the tray.  (You can’t see the top of the tray). 
 
 
Stage 4: What if 
• If you had not been friendly with the maintenance personnel you might not have been 
talking to the guy (and not been distracted). 
• If it was a different driver. 
• If the visual display was different (location – brightness) the it might have been noted 
• If an audible alarm came on when the truck came on with the tray up. 
• If the road had been in better condition. 
• If he had been further from the reject bin. 
• Could have an interlock with some over-ride on it. 
• There is a wire that you usually contact to show that the tray is up. If you hit the wire 
then a second comes down in front of you to show you have your tray up. 
• If the park up bay had been the other side of the wires this would have detected it. 
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 APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 4: Example of raw data collected during interviews with Trainees 
Question Response 
CURRENT ROLE Operate rear dumpers – CAT 793, 797, Komatsu 930E 
HOW LONG IN CURRENT ROLE? 9 mths 
PAST WORK EXPERIENCE 
- On this equipment 
- Other equipment 
- Other industry 
- Other minesite 
- Other 
 
 
NO 
Forklifts, medium vehicles 
Courier driver 
NO 
- 
REASON FOR TRAINING Learning skills 
STAGE IN TRAINING Feedback session 
PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE WITH 
SIMULATOR TRAINING 
2 days in simulator Æ 1 mth with trainer operator Æ on own 
(797) 
Progressed from 793 Æ 797 Æ 930E 
Familiarisation + 1 shift operator trainer for 930E 
PREFERRED METHOD OF TRAINING Any where trainer is focussed on what trainee can do 
WHY? More personal 
WHAT’S GOOD ABOUT SIMULATOR 
TRAINING 
Gives you confidence 
Helps you to know what to expect in the real world 
WHAT’S BAD ABOUT SIMULATOR 
TRAINING? 
Not real enough for experienced operators 
HOW DO YOU LET YOUR TRAINER 
KNOW ABOUT PROBLEMS YOU HAVE 
ACQUIRING SKILLS? 
During session – ask as it happens, trainer prepares 
trainee for next scenario (not what, just that it’s imminent) 
Post session – use printout to understand impact of 
incorrect decisions  
DO YOU PREFER TO LEARN BY TRAIL 
& ERROR OR A MORE STRUCTURED 
APPROACH? 
Structured approach (went in cold 1st session – no 
familiarisation 
ARE THERE ANY ASPECTS OF 
EQUIPMENT OPERATION THAT 
COULD BE CHANGED TO MAKEIT 
EASIER OR MORE INTUITIVE TO 
OPERATE? 
930E (2 mths experience) – braking is delayed – told 
during verbal familiarisation) 
CAT rear dump trucks – gear changing is more 
complicated than Komatsu 
62 
 
 63 
 
Question Response 
LIKE variety of changing from 1 vehicle to another 
HOW DOES THE TRAINER HELP YOU 
DEVELOP YOUR SKILLS TO A HIGHER 
LEVEL? 
- Pointers on how to do it well and then pick what 
suits you best 
- How to give operator better leeway to adjust for 
error (positioning under shovel) 
- Combine different approaches Æ better options, 
greater range 
HOW DO YOU PASS ON WHAT 
YOU’VE LEARNED THROUGH 
SIMUALTOR TRAINING TO:  
Other operators – exchange ideas with other trainees 
Trainers – not so much with simulator trainers, more with 
trainer operators 
ARE THERE SCENARIOS THAT MAY 
ARISE OR YOU’VE HEARD ABOUT 
THAT AREN’T COVERED BY 
SIMULATOR TRAINING? 
NO – used rocks on road, heat in tyres 
DO YOU AND THE TRAINER 
EXHANGE INFORMATION 
(FEEDBACK) ABOUT ISSUES WITH 
ACTUAL OPERATION?  
 
IS INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
(FEEDBACK) DIFFERENT WHEN 
TRAINING ON THE ACTUAL 
EQUIPMENT? 
 
DO YOU HAVE ONGOING 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
(FEEDBACK) WITH TRAINERS AND 
OTHER MENTORS? 
Informal – ask shovel & other truck operators 
IF MENTORS, WHAT ARE THEIR 
ROLES AT SITE? 
Alert drivers to errors 
No formal process, but advised by trainer to ask mentors 
 
 
Appendix 5: Interaction nodes interview template 
 
Communication frequency measures 
0  Never  Never 
1  Rarely  1‐3 times per month 
2  Occasionally  1‐3 times per rotation/week 
3  Often  More than once per shift 
• Do you communicate informally with people in the following roles?  
• Please indicate how often by placing a number from 0 – 3 in each box, according to the communication frequency measures above 
Your role  Training Supervisor 
Simulator 
Trainer 
Field 
Trainer 
Trainee 
Operator 
Operator  Shift 
Supervisor
Production 
Supervisor 
Maintainer  Maintenance 
Supervisor 
OEM/Dealer 
                    
Tick the boxes below where interactions occur between you and Training Supervisor, Simulator Trainer, Field Trainer, Operator, Shift 
Supervisor, Production Supervisor, Maintainer, Maintenance Supervisor, OEMs/Dealers 
Information about haul 
truck activities such as...... 
During planned meetings 
or other verbal 
interactions 
During unplanned meetings 
or verbal interactions 
At what time during 
your shift? Start, during 
or end? 
Is this information 
passed on to others & 
how? 
Pre‐start checks        
Normal Operation eg 
loading 
       
Normal Operation eg 
dumping 
       
Unplanned operational 
situations eg engine fire 
       
Scheduled maintenance         
Unscheduled maintenance         
Hot seat shift changes         
Scheduled down time         
Unscheduled down time         
Training          
VERBAL        NON‐VERBAL        WRITTEN  
• Issues relating to the safe operation and maintenance of the 
equipment 
‐ Face to face  ‐ Body language 
‐ Sign language ‐ 2‐way/phone 
• Information that might influence the skill level, behaviours and 
performance of haul truck operators 
Consider any informal communication about  
‐ Sticky notes 
‐ Email/notes on memory stick  
‐ Online discussion boards 
‐ Reports/checklists 
INFORMAL 
FORMAL 
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 APPENDIX 6: Overview of the simulator training program 
Simulator training followed a similar format at each site, with scope for individual 
trainer/assessors to drive effectiveness according to their skills and abilities. The simulator 
software module being used for instruction (Caterpillar 797B) could be configured for a range of 
events or scenarios to test developing skills. 
Generally, there were three discreet stages of simulator training for new starters undertaking the 
haul truck operator package: 
1. The Pre-simulator familiarisation session was designed to 
a. Introduce the trainee to the terminology specific to haul truck operation 
b. Provide a basic understanding of  
i. equipment functions (such as braking & steering) 
ii. mine site environment 
iii. pre-shift meeting areas 
iv. dumping & loading procedures 
v. actions (such as abusive gear shifts) that adversely affect equipment 
reliability 
2. The initial simulator session was designed to familiarise the trainee with 
a. Haul truck operation 
b. Pre-start checks and visibility issues (using a parked up haul truck for walk 
around inspection) 
c. Work instructions 
3. Additional simulator training sessions were conducted as required to develop and 
assess skills for 
a. Planned haul truck operation, such as  
i. reversing under loaders, shovels etc 
ii. dumping procedures 
iii. working with dozers 
iv. gear selection when going uphill & downhill – loaded and unloaded 
v. brake testing protocols & braking sequences 
b. Unplanned operator responses to site hazards & emergencies such as  
i. rocks on the haul road 
ii. engine fire  
iii. loss of brake function 
iv. low oil pressure 
Once trainees had mastered the skills outlined above, the practice was to assign them to a crew 
and a field trainer who was a regular haul truck operator within the nominated crew. The field 
trainer then took over the training role, using a combination of coaching and mentoring 
techniques to further develop the trainee’s skills and confidence. A scheduled follow up session 
on the simulator was designed to review skill levels and to assess the need, if any, for refresher 
training. This was also supported by ongoing mentoring by the simulator trainer, which was 
commonly initiated by the trainee ‘popping in’ to see the trainer at the end of the shift. This 
response was considered to be a reflection of the bond or trust established during simulator 
training.   
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 For experienced operators, simulator training offers an opportunity to refresh skills and to 
exchange information with trainers about issues that may be impacting optimal operation. While 
initial skills training was well planned, refresher training tended to occur on an ad hoc basis 
when conditions in the field and availability of operators provided an opportunity, rather than as 
an integral part of further skills development and optimisation. Refresher training could be 
triggered by incidents involving mobile equipment, changes to mine rules and routine operation 
or unplanned maintenance that may be occurring due to less than adequate operator 
performance. Assessment of the data provided via the MINEcare program, which is part of the 
despatch module, is a useful source of information that can be used to trigger refresher training 
needs.  
Trainees who were completely new to mining and haul truck operation considered simulator 
training to be a safe and effective way to develop basic skills and gain confidence before being 
exposed to reality of the pre-strip or production environment. 
Experienced operators undertaking simulator training for the first time were more critical of the 
inadequacies of the simulator software in replicating the exact situation at site. Some issues, 
such as signs showing the speed limit in miles per hour instead of kilometres per hour, could be 
easily updated, but others posed more of a challenge. The sense of real danger during an 
engine fire was difficult to replicate, but the race against the clock to complete the emergency 
response actions precisely within a given time limit, provided a different challenge that 
enhanced the learning process.  
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 APPENDIX 7: Notes about the strategic use of communication mechanisms to 
ensure consistency & currency of training documentation 
Strategies needed to keep field trainer/assessors up to date and to ensure change 
management is effective for updated documentation [Note that the physical location of 
the training department can be a barrier – head of department & admin/booking system 
separated from simulator training area – simulator training area more accessible to field 
trainers – also more attracted to this area as it is less formal and more closely associated 
with their usual environment]  
• Colour coding used to ID departments + current training competency codes on front 
page of document 
• Field trainers/assessors have to come to training advisors for forms as they have no 
access to electronic copies to print and use 
• Verbal interactions provide an opportunity for information exchange 
• If the trainer/assessor asks for training documentation for assessment, it confirms that 
the training need has been identified by the supervisor 
• If the operator requests training documentation, it flags the possibility that training may 
not have been approved according to the standard procedures 
Communication Issues – rosters mean that there is little interaction across crews working 
in the same areas 
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 APPENDIX  8: Interaction strengths 
Role/Participant 
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O
EM
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Simulator 
Trainer/Assessor 3 3 2 3 1 3 3 1 1 1
Simulator 
Trainer/Assessor 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Simulator 
Trainer/Assessor 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 1
Simulator 
Trainer/Assessor 3 3 3 3 3 3
Training Supervisor 
3 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 0
Safety Training 
Coordinator (contractor) 0 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 1
Training, Safety 
Improvement 2 3 2 2 1 3 3 2 2 2
Training Advisor - 
maintenance 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
Training Advisor - 
maintenance 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1
Maintenance trainer 
0 0 3 1 3 3 3 3 3
Mobile Maintenance 
Superintendent 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 3 2 3 2
Maintainer / limited 
training role 1 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 0
Reliability Engineer 
0 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 3
Operator 
2 2 3 2 3 3 2 1 1 1
Production Coordinator 
0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Pre-strip Supervisor 
(previously operator 
trainer/advisor) 2 2 3 3 3 3
Health & Safety Advisor 
1 0 0 1 2 2 2 3 3 1
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